

Abstracts in Alphabetical Order by Author's Last Name

Russell on Implication

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In *The Principles of Mathematics* Russell argued that logical implication is just material implication, though he allowed that logical arguments often rely on 'formal implication' – generalized material implications. Russell's position was criticised by Moore and C. I. Lewis who both argued that logical implication includes a modal component. Russell rejected this criticism, while accepting that material implication does not suffice for the formal deducibility which is characteristic of logical proofs. In my paper I examine Russell's position and assess how far it remains defensible.

The Pragmatic Origins of Ethical Expressivism: Stevenson, Dewey, and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science

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Ethical expressivism is generally traced to Hume via Ayer and other mid-century emotivists. But this narrative overlooks historically important interactions between logical empiricism and pragmatism. Here I highlight two critical episodes: Dewey's 1939 contributions to Neurath and Carnap's *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, and C.L. Stevenson's attempt to combine emotivism with pragmatism in his influential *Ethics and Language* (1944). Recognizing these interactions may help shed light on expressivism's past and future development.

Proof, Justification, and Reduction to Primitive Truths

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The problem of the justification of deduction is to explain how primitive truths of logic can be justified. This problem is much-discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy, owing in large part to Michael Dummett's influential presentation of it. In this paper, I show how the key elements of the problem—particularly notions of proof, justification, and primitive truth—figure importantly in Frege's philosophy of logic and his logicist project. I investigate the role that these notions play in Frege's conception of a systematic science, and use this investigation to shed light on the problem of the justification of deduction.

Bi-polarity and Double Negation: Wittgenstein's Objection to Russell's Theory of Judgment

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It is widely acknowledged that Russell abandoned his unpublished "Theory of Knowledge" manuscript in 1913 because of an objection by Wittgenstein. However, there is no consensus on what precisely the objection is. In this paper, I offer a new account of that objection. The main thesis is that, by generating a theory of propositions out of a theory of judgment, Russell cannot explain the relation between p and not-not- p . For Wittgenstein, that is not a mere problem for inference, but a symptom of a poor theory of propositions.

Reading Quine's claim that definitional abbreviations create synonymies

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In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" Quine claims that definitional abbreviations create transparent synonymies and that all *other* species of synonymy are less intelligible. Against this, Grice and Strawson assert that "[T]he notion of synonymy by explicit convention would be unintelligible if the notion of synonymy by usage were not presupposed." I will argue that Quine's claim about abbreviations does not presuppose the notion of synonymy by usage, but, instead, comes to this:

where a new expression A_s is introduced as an abbreviation for an already meaningful expression S , ' $A_s \leftrightarrow S$ ' is shorthand for a logical truth, ' $S \leftrightarrow S$ '.

On "Vagueness"

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Bertrand Russell's 1923 "Vagueness" has been widely recognized as a seminal article, but Russell's piece has also been criticized in the literature on metaphysical vagueness. The criticisms levied can be divided into three claims: (1) Russell confused vagueness with generality, (2) Russell abandoned logic, and (3) Russell failed to show that all natural languages are vague. I argue that none of these claims is true, and I infer from this negative result that the insights contained in Russell's 1923 article have yet to be fully explored.

The Sheffer Box

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In May 2012, with the help of Bernard Linsky, I discovered a missing box of original documents and research materials pertaining to the work of H.M. Sheffer (1882-1964), the logician known for his strokes. The box had been assembled and saved by Burton Dreben, with whom I worked on Sheffer in 1988. My talk will set these materials into philosophical context, and report on the latest research results concerning Sheffer's relation to modal logic, model-theoretic ideas, and Russell.

Inventor of the theory of "neutral monism", Sheffer was a student of Royce, William James, Huntington, and Russell, and deeply influenced by Frege and Peano. A precise contemporary of C.I. Lewis, he modeled himself as Russell's representative in the debate over strict implication, but was also an adamant critic of Lewis's conventionalist views about logic and mathematics, though calling himself a pragmatist. As a key purveyor of mathematical logic in the United States, he influenced many, including C.H. Langford and, even if slightly and indirectly, Zermelo.

On Weitz on Wittgenstein and Defining "Art"

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It is nearly 60 years since the publication of Morris Weitz's "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics." His article is important primarily for extending ideas from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* to the problem of defining "art." It also helped to shape at least some of the reception of Wittgenstein's work, and this influence persists today. In this talk I will present an alternative to Weitz's particular readings and uses of Wittgenstein, which I hope will suggest a different way to conceive of Wittgenstein's later work's relationship to philosophical aesthetics and the arts more generally. Weitz's appeals to Wittgenstein in his article make for a compelling case study in the mediated reception of primary texts.

Russell and the Neo-Logicists

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In his *Reading Frege's Grundgesetze* (2012), Richard Heck claims that the neo-logicist construction of the integers has certain "philosophical" merits which distinguish it from Russell's definitions of mathematical concepts. Drawing conclusions from an analysis of the remote (more mathematical) parts of *Principia Mathematica* and of *The Principles of Mathematics*, I will contend that this diagnosis is grounded on a quite narrow view of the philosophy of mathematics agenda.

J. L. Austin on Linguistic Phenomenology and Disanalogical Analysis

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Looking at some less frequently quoted passages from his oeuvre, I argue that Austin's philosophical writings contain a certain constructive element, whose philosophical significance, alas, has become more and more obscure to subsequent generations of philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition.

Identity in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein gives an account of identity according to which the equality sign “=” is not used as a two place predicate to form sentences about objects. In his logical notation, Wittgenstein expresses identity of objects by the identity of signs and not by using the equality sign (cf. TLP 5.53). In my paper, I am arguing against the claim that Wittgenstein thereby bans the equality sign from his logical notation. I am criticising an interpretation –defended by Wehmeier among others – according to which sentences containing the equality sign are always problematic because they express non-tautological necessary truths. As I will show, this claim is too general: Not all expressions containing the equality sign are problematic. In addition, it is misleading to connect the problem of identity with the notion of truth. The problem of identity concerns the question of how to distinguish between objects in language and, according to Wittgenstein, this question does not concern truths about objects at all. In order to defend these points, I am going to discuss Wittgenstein’s remarks on Russell’s use of the equality sign as well as his criticism of Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles.

Quine’s Philosophies of Language

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In this paper I argue that Quine’s work contains two quite different enterprises, each of which might be called ‘Quine’s Philosophy of Language’. I very briefly discuss some aspects of Russell’s work before 1918 in which the two enterprises are unified; I then contrast Russell with Quine, for whom they are quite distinct.

Reanimating Ayer's Significance Criterion

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The unmitigated failure of Ayer’s significance criterion reveals the fundamental folly of any attempt to formulate such a criterion. This is the familiar, critical appraisal of the historically contentious search for a precise litmus test that would distinguish statements empirical observation bears on from others. Neither the specific indictment of Ayer’s efforts nor the negative assessment of the general project should be accepted. Ayer’s original proposals were certainly inadequate, but it is far from clear the deficiencies cannot be remedied by well-motivated amendments. Alonzo Church’s decisive criticism was an early volley in a more than half-century exchange between proponents and detractors. Calling that series of conceptually and technically intricate maneuvers “the sorry history of unintuitive and ineffective patches,” (Lewis 1988, 4) is neither charitable nor accurate.

Underdetermination, Realism, and Transcendental Metaphysics in Quine

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I consider afresh the apparent tension between Quine’s scientific realism and his acceptance of the thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theory. His particular form of naturalism—especially the account of language—gives the issue a precise shape, but a peculiar and on the surface unstable shape, one in danger of recognising the legitimacy of a point of view which by its own lights ought not to be possible. I argue that the thesis gets less traction in Quine’s philosophy the more radical it is taken to be; a radical form of the thesis does not force a Quinean of accepting that there is a serious transcendental, non-naturalistic or metaphysical point of view.

Gödel's Turing, or: the Search for "Absolute" Epistemological Notions

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In the first half of our lecture we consider the ideas of Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture against the background of the development of computability in the 1930s, focusing particularly on its fruition, in Gödel's view, with the notion of Turing computability in 1936. In the second half of our lecture we frame what might be considered a Gödelian implementation of these ideas, taking contemporary logical developments into account.

Three Unpublished Russell Manuscripts from 1903

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I present and discuss three unpublished manuscripts written by Russell in 1903. One is a list of axioms for his "functional theory", anticipating the Lambda Calculus. Another, "Proof that No Function Takes All Values", explores the status of Cantor's disproof of a greatest cardinal on the theory that not all complexes can be analyzed into function and argument. The final manuscript, "Meaning and Denotation", examines how his pre-1905 distinction between the meaning and denotation applies to functions and their arguments. All three illustrate the close connection between Russell's work on logical paradoxes and his work on the theory of meaning.

Ryle's "Intellectualist Legend" in Historical Context

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Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge-*how* and knowledge-*that* was widely taken for granted in analytic philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. Ryle criticized the "intellectualist legend": to do something intelligently is "to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice." In this century Jason Stanley (initially with Timothy Williamson) have attacked Ryle's distinction, arguing for what they call "intellectualism": "knowing-how is a species of knowing-that." Stanley accuses Ryle of setting up a straw man in his critique of "intellectualism." The ensuing debate has accepted the terms set by Stanley's discussion. Examining the use of the term(s) "(anti-)intellectualism" in the first half of the 20th century, however, shows that Ryle was *not* criticizing a straw man, and furthermore, his actual position has gone missing in the 21st century discussion. This argument illustrates how the history of philosophy can inform contemporary philosophical inquiry.

Bolzano on Intuitions, Demonstratives and Communication

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Initially, Bolzano defined *Anschaungen an sich* (Intuitions) as those non-propositional components of propositions that are both atomic and singular. He soon came to realize that this definition does not quite capture the role that he wants to ascribe to Intuitions. Bolzano held that only certain utterances of 'this' (or of its counterparts in other languages) express Intuitions, and he circumscribed the relevant class of utterances in a way that is strongly reminiscent of Russell's characterization of the use of the demonstrative as a 'logically proper name'. Unlike the Russell of 1918, however, he realized that this view seems to make statements in which Intuitions are expressed useless for communication, but he argued (successfully, I think) that this appearance is deceptive.

Kant and the History of Logic

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The idea that Kant's views on logic played a substantial role in shaping our understanding of the discipline today as well as its place within the theory of knowledge is likely to be, at best, controversial. For one thing, the idea clashes with the standard accounts of the development of logic over the course of the modern era. This paper is mostly devoted to criticizing standard account of the development of logic over the modern period and of Kant's contribution to it. My aim is explain why the standard accounts can be misleading, give what I take to be sufficient reasons to revise some

common beliefs concerning the context in which Kant's views on logic emerged and, after sketching Kant's own views, to provide evidence of their impact on his successors.

Objectuality and Representationalism : Meinong and Twardowski on Content and Object

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In this paper I shall question a common reading of the intellectual relationship between Twardowski and Meinong. The latter is supposed to have been some kind of psychologist and to have become an ontologist - objectualist after his reading of Twardowski. The problem of representations of impossible objects is supposed to have led to the doctrine of the *Aussersein*, which is, some ontological domain firstly dedicated to non-existent and non-subsistent objects. I argue that Meinong had already some distinction between psychic acts, contents and objects thanks to his reflexion on complexions and relations; and that although he adopted some Twardowskian arguments about the non-identity between content and object, he did not endorse the Twardowskian theory of the relation between content and object. On the contrary, Meinong criticized representationalist theories, like the Twardowskian one (or similar theories, inspired by Brentano) that defined objectuality by the fact of becoming represented. Meinong substituted the notion of "grasping" to the notion of "representing" and elaborated the notion of *Aussersein* in order to free the notion of an object from representationalism. *Aussersein* appeared in the Meinongian views in order to disconnect objectuality from his alleged essential relationship to representation and its ontological commitments.

Russell's Linguistic Turn

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In his *Autobiography*, Russell writes: "During my time in prison [in 1918], I had become interested in the problems connected with meaning, which in earlier days I had completely ignored." I distinguish two aspects to this development in Russell's philosophy. The first is closely related to Russell's interaction with the early Wittgenstein and has its outcome Russell's accepting a view akin to Wittgenstein's view of sentences as "pictures". The second reflects a side to Russell that is deeply opposed to Wittgenstein's early view and that leads Russell to accept (by 1919) a naturalist, behaviorist-inspired account of language and to write, for example: "A word has meaning, more or less vague; but the meaning is only to be discovered by observing its use: the use comes first, and the meaning is to be distilled out of it."

Russell's 1914 Course on Advanced Logic at Harvard

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I will report on the contents of Harry T. Costello's notes for Bertrand Russell's course "Advanced Logic" (Philosophy 21) given at Harvard University in 1914. The notes were located in May of 2014 among Costello's papers at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut. Costello was the teaching assistant and gave fourteen lectures before Russell arrived and then took notes on Russell's lectures twenty-six lectures over the rest of the term. T.S. Eliot also attended the course and his notes supplement those of Costello.

Arnošt Kolman's Critique of Mathematical Fetishism

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Arnošt Kolman was Czech philosopher and Communist official. We would like to look at Kolman's arguments against logical positivism which revolve around the notion of the fetishization of mathematics. Kolman is aiming for the fact that a thing acquires besides its real existence another formal existence. Fetishism means this fantastic detachment of the physical characteristics of real things from these things. We identify Kolman's two main arguments against logical positivism. (1) He applied Lenin's arguments against Mach's empiricism-criticism to Russell's neutral monism. (2) Kolman argued that the logical and mathematical fetishes are epistemologically deprived of any historical and dynamic dimension.

On John Wisdom

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Between 1930 and 1956 John Wisdom (1904–1993) set the tone in analytic philosophy in the UK. Wisdom was the leading figure of the so called Cambridge School of therapeutic analysis which included such other thinkers as B. A. Farrell, G. A. Paul, M. Lazerowitz and Norman Malcolm. By the 1960s, Wisdom's influence had radically diminished. This was due largely to the ascendancy of exact philosophy of language and analytic metaphysics. This development, together with the rise of scientism, overshadowed the exploration of philosophical puzzles, human understanding ('apprehension') and techniques of deliberation, which were Wisdom's three chief theoretical concerns.

Pragmatism's Subterranean influence on the Vienna Circle: Peirce, Ramsey, Wittgenstein

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An underappreciated fact in the history of analytic philosophy is that American pragmatism had an early and strong influence on the Vienna Circle. That path - from Charles Peirce to Frank Ramsey to Ludwig Wittgenstein to Moritz Schlick - is traced in this paper, and along the way some standard understandings of Ramsey and Wittgenstein, especially, are radically altered.

Scientific Philosophy and the Rejection of Metaphysics from Russell to Carnap to Quine

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While Carnap and Quine are most often remembered for their dispute over analyticity, their fundamental agreement in their philosophical approaches is often overlooked. In an attempt to remedy this, I argue for the importance of Russell as a philosophical starting point for both of them, each taking on the task of completing Russell's ideal of a scientific philosophy. In particular, they apply Russell's methods of logical construction to account for the fundamental structure of science. From this common origin, I then urge a crucial difference—specifically, their disagreement over the status of logic for scientific philosophy.

How to Read the Later Wittgenstein. An Austrian Guide

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The later Wittgenstein's reflections on mind, language and colours deal almost without exception with distinctions and claims to be found in the writings of contemporary and earlier Austrian and German philosophers. I identify some of the relevant materials and show how Wittgenstein's treatment of the claims and distinctions made by his Austro-German contemporaries and predecessors differs from earlier treatments.

Was Sellars an Error Theorist?

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Wilfrid Sellars described the moral syllogism that supports the inference "I ought to do x" from "Everyone ought to do x" as a "syntactical disguise" which embodies a "mistake", though he regards this form of reasoning as constitutive of the moral point of view. Durkheim, or so we argue, was one source of this reasoning and this historical connection illuminates Sellars' reconstruction of the moral point of view. We are primarily concerned with fleshing out the relationship between normative discourse and motivation, and the place in this relationship for error. We argue that although Sellars should be read as advocating an error theory about moral reasoning, he is not entitled to the conclusion that naturalism and normativity are compatible.

Brandom and Sellars on Empiricism and Modality

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I develop an objection to what Robert Brandom sees as Wilfrid Sellars' most general and most powerful argument against empiricism. Brandom's statement of Sellars' strategy runs together two distinct issues, corresponding to two different notions of observational vocabulary. When the distinction is made explicit, it becomes clear that the empiricist can avoid the devastating consequences that Brandom envisions. I then argue that Brandom's discussion overlooks important differences between three stages of empiricist thought. Taking these differences into account restricts the applicability of Sellars' arguments and blunts the force of his claim that Sellars has deflated Quine's modal skepticism.

Frege's Alleged Pragmatism

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Tyler Burge claims that Frege offers a pragmatic justification for believing the principles of his formalism to be both true and logical. However, I show that Frege sought no such justification because his goal was to codify the principles implicit in our inferential practice. Indeed, I argue that pragmatism cannot be reconciled with Frege's constitutive view of logic's relation to cognition. Frege thought our certain knowledge of basic logical laws secured by our status as judges. Beyond establishing the importance of properly understanding Frege's constitutive view, my interpretation shows how Frege avoids a social version of the pitfall of psychologism.

Frege's early philosophy of logic

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I shall endeavour to explain some of the more puzzling features of Frege's account of logic in Begriffsschrift.

Mental Science and Moral Science at Cambridge in the 19th century: Moore's milieu and the origins of analytical philosophy

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I argue in this paper that 19th century mental science—psychology—was a deeply entrenched part of the Cambridge philosophy curriculum, integrated with other aspects of Moore's philosophical background, and thus inextricably linked to Moore's early philosophical development. Accounts of this period have for the most part stressed the extent of the influence on Moore of Bradley's idealist metaphysics. But here I want to examine more closely the extent of the influence on Moore of the combination of metaphysics and psychology that was known as mental philosophy or mental science. I believe that the influence of his exposure to debates in the mental sciences had (among other things) a number of striking consequences on his interpretation of Kantian ethics and Kantian logic and psychology in his 1897 and 1898 Dissertations. The upshot, as we know, was first a significant break with tradition, and shortly thereafter, the inauguration of a new method in philosophy.

Frege's Introduction of Value-ranges: a Reading of *Grundgesetze* §§29-31

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It is very widely held that in §31 Frege's attempt to demonstrate that that value-range functor has a meaning is fallacious on account of the impredicativity of Frege's higher-order quantifiers. I observe Frege notes that the stipulations introducing the value-range functor do not suffice to specify a meaning for it. I argue that in §31, Frege presents a non-demonstrative argument that we may, nevertheless, treat the value-range functor as if the stipulations did fix its meaning.

Frege and Davidson: Logical Aliens and Interpretation

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In the *Grundgesetze*, Frege attacks the position of the *psychologicistic logician*, according to whom the laws of logic merely describe how human beings, at this point in time, happen to think. Frege argues that this leads to a view on which objectivity disappears, and where we land in a sort of nihilistic abyss in which the very ideas of assertion, agreement, and disagreement dissolve. I argue that some of Donald Davidson's comments regarding interpretation can be read as making a parallel argument against an analogous target: one who would naturalize rationality and epistemology.

Frege on Real Numbers

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This paper is concerned with Gottlob Frege's theory of the real numbers as sketched in the second volume of his masterpiece *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*. One of Frege's more significant claims is that the cardinal numbers and the real numbers constitute "completely different domains". We begin with a detailed review of Frege's theory. This is followed by a critique, outlining Frege's linguistic motivation for ontologically distinguishing the cardinal numbers from the real numbers. We briefly consider how Frege's metaphysics might need to be developed, or amended, to accommodate some of the problems. Finally, we offer a detailed examination of Frege's Application Constraint – that the reals ought to have their applicability built directly into their characterization.

A History of Categorical Grammar from Frege to Montague

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Categorical grammar is a mathematically formulated type of syntax which has proven highly fruitful and adaptable in the philosophy of language and logic. The seminal paper in the subject was Ajdukiewicz's 'Die syntaktische Konnexität' of 1935. This is based directly on ideas of Russell and Leśniewski, and indirectly on the precepts of Husserl and the practice of Frege. After a period of eclipse, it underwent a revival in the 1970s particularly at the hands of Richard Montague. This paper traces the sometimes crabwise development of the ideas, notations and terminology between Frege's early account of the functional analysis of complex expressions and the sophistication and complication of Montague grammar, trying to unravel the ambiguities and put the achievements as well as the limitations of the approach into perspective.

The Treadmill Argument and its Dependence on the Doctrine of Judgment

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Frege, Moore and Russell once held that truth is indefinable. To ground their theory, they employed a cryptic 'Treadmill' argument from vicious circularity. I shall reconstruct this argument and explain that it depends on a denial of the redundancy thesis about truth and so-called 'doctrine of judgment'. My interpretation of the Treadmill has serious consequences for the ongoing debate about Frege's conception of judgment. Contrary to a view of Wolfgang Kühne, judgment is an epistemic act by means of which we acquire a knowledge-*that* rather than mere putting forward a thought with a commitment to its truth.

Ryle and Behaviorism

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There is no need to treat behaviourism as a reductive approach to the mind. If we take it to be the non-reductive claim that to describe someone's state of mind is to describe how they are disposed to behave, it is still distinct from its successor in twentieth century philosophy of mind – functionalism – and its successor in twentieth century psychology – cognitivism – which identify states of mind with states having particular causal roles in a person's overall psychology. I argue that the move away

from behaviourism was a mistake, and I use Ryle's conception of the mind, which can harmlessly be described as behaviourist despite his objection to 'isms' generally, to show this.

The Ontological Theory of Relation

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The paper investigates Roman Ingarden's ontological theory of relations. Although Ingarden (a disciple of Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski) is regarded as one of the most important representatives of the phenomenological movement, he has a lot of affinities to the analytic tradition as well. Inspired by a recent interest in Ingarden in the analytic philosophy (most notably by Kit Fine, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith), the paper reconstructs his existential and formal description of the relation as a multi-subject state of affairs occurring between two or more objects.

Schlick and Wittgenstein: The Theory of Affirmations Revisited

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This talk will investigate whether consideration of the philosophical relationship between Moritz Schlick and Ludwig Wittgenstein, in particular Schlick's familiarity with certain writings of the so-called middle Wittgenstein, may allow for the redemption of Schlick's spectacularly unsuccessful mid-1930s theory of affirmations — albeit for the price of removing him from the philosophy of science narrowly understood.

Mereology Partially Fails

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One of the streams in the early development of set theory was an attempt to use mereology, a formal theory of parthood, as a foundational tool. The first such attempt is due to a Polish logician, Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939). The attempt failed, but there is another, prima facie more promising attempt by Jerzy Slupecki (1904-1987), who employed his generalized mereology to build mereological foundations for type theory. In this paper I (1) situate Lesniewski's attempt in the development of set theory, (2) describe and evaluate Lesniewski's approach, (3) describe Slupecki's strategy without unnecessary technical details, and (4) evaluate it with a rather negative outcome. The issues discussed go beyond merely historical interests due to the current popularity of mereology and because they are related to nominalistic attempts to understand mathematics in general.

Frege on Judgment and Justification

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Carnap and Kemeny on Models and Semantics

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It is well known that Carnap's semantic turn in the late thirties was deeply influenced by Tarski's work, as Carnap himself acknowledges in his *Introduction to Semantics* (1942). But Carnap's views on semantics later evolved as his work was to include both modal logic and a program of inductive logic, which required a non-Tarskian logical framework. In this talk, I shall examine the role of Kemeny's work in the evolution of Carnap's views on models and semantics in the 1950s.

Frege's unmetaphysical story about natural language and truth

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According to the standard interpretation, Frege is interested in a theory of truth, at least for his logical language and perhaps also for a cleaned up version of natural language. The kind of theory in

question is one on which the truth-value of a sentence is determined by a reference relation that holds between its sub-sentential constituents and extra-linguistic entities. Proper names refer to objects, and predicates (function-expressions) to concepts (functions). There is an unfortunate consequence, however, of combining this view about truth with Frege's explicit statements about concepts and functions. According to Frege, a concept (function) must hold or not of (have a value for) each object. If a predicate is to refer to a concept, then, it must be either true or false of each object. But few, if any, of our natural language predicates pass this test. Hence the sentences of natural language are shot through with non-referring constituents – constituents whose occurrence precludes such sentences from having truth-values. The upshot is that, in our everyday natural language statements, we repeatedly, and inadvertently, wander into fiction.

Given this problematic upshot, many assume that Frege simply did not recognize the consequences of his views about concepts and functions. But a look at his writings shows that this is not so. How, then, can Frege reasonably hold that there is a distinction between '1+1=2' and 'The Scylla had six dragon gullets'? If we are not prepared to give up Frege's explicit statements about concepts and functions, the only way to answer this question is to give up the standard interpretation. Happily, as I have argued elsewhere, there are already numerous reasons for giving up the standard interpretation, numerous places in Frege's corpus where he explicitly says things that are inconsistent with the standard interpretation. What I will try to show is that Frege finds the distinction between the two sentences (the second fictional, the first not) in the role these sentences can (or cannot) play in our search for truth. The distinction, I will argue, illuminates the importance of Frege's context principle, not only for our understanding of Frege's writings, but for our own understanding of the role language plays in our search for truth.

Quine, Analyticity, and Naturalism

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Here I present another look at the topic of Quine on analyticity. I focus not on epistemological issues but on the argument that Quine's rejection of the analyticity of logic (and his neglect of inference rules in favour of logical truths) entails the complete indeterminacy of the logical consequence relation. I defend this criticism against counter-criticisms but argue that Quine took a number of different, contradictory, positions on the analyticity of logic. We can find, in Quine, a still radical position, consonant with naturalism, which allows a minimal role for the analyticity of logic whilst being compatible with Quine's fallibilism.

The Story of the German Translation of Tarski's Book on Truth

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The correspondence (1933–1936) between Kazimierz Twardowski and Alfred Tarski was recently discovered. It concerns the translation of Tarski's famous work on truth *Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych* (The Concept of truth in Languages of Deductive Sciences), published in Polish in 1933, into German. This exchange explains some historical issues, in particular, reasons of changing the title (in German, *Das Wahrheitsbegriff in formalisierten Sprachen*) and the participation of other philosophers and logicians (Ajdukiewicz, Carnap, Gödel, Kokoszyńska, Popper) in translating Tarski's work as well as some of his personal problems related to the translation project.