

Short abstracts

Sophia Arbeiter, University of Pittsburgh

‘The Subject in the *Tractatus*’

This talk discusses the Tractarian subject, with a focus on the passages on solipsism. My reading is guided by Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism in the 1930s, which I will use to illuminate the Tractarian passages. In the 1930s he conceives of the solipsist as proposing a specific notation, so that for instance what we express as “I see a red square” is expressed as “A red square is seen.” In this notation, there is no reference to an experiencing or thinking subject. Nevertheless, the solipsist realizes that this notation cannot be justified. I propose that this realization stands behind the “truth in solipsism” in the *Tractatus*—while solipsism is “correct”, it cannot be “said”.

Mark Balaguer, California State University, Los Angeles

‘Strawson, Ordinary Language, and the Priority of Holding Responsible Over Being Responsible’

It’s often held that P.F. Strawson endorsed a radical and groundbreaking priority thesis according to which holding someone morally responsible is prior to (or more fundamental than) being morally responsible. This paper develops and motivates a novel interpretation of Strawson on which he endorsed a fairly pedestrian (and non-radical) priority thesis—a thesis that falls out of the view (which I attribute to Strawson) that the meanings of our terms (e.g., ‘morally responsible’) are determined by our usage and intentions and practices. In addition, this paper also argues against the radical priority thesis that’s often (erroneously) attributed to Strawson.

Gabriela Besler, University of Silesia in Katowice

‘Stanisław Leśniewski’s collaboration with Heinrich Scholz and his school. Based on some archival documents’

The scientific collaboration of Polish logicians and Heinrich Scholz (and his school) is already known; it was fruitful for both sides. I will shed light on connections between Stanisław Leśniewski, Heinrich Scholz and Karl Schröter based on some archival documents from archives in Münster and Berlin. The documents referring to the so-called Frege’s way out are the most important.

Filip Buekens, KU Leuven

‘Had Donald Davidson Anything in Common with Jacques Derrida?’

In the beginning of the 1980s, Donald Davidson was enthusiastically recruited by continental philosophers and literary scholars who pointed out affinities with the ideas of Jacques Derrida. I will argue that the affinities between Davidson and Derrida were extremely exaggerated, often based on a couple of quotes, never supported by fully developed arguments and fueled by wishful thinking. Davidson's ideas were merely strategically important to those who valued Derrida and deconstruction but did not want to be accused of relativism and semantic nihilism. Many of the proposed ‘encounters’ between Derrida and Davidson were based on misunderstandings, vague associations but no arguments, and a sloppy reading of Davidson work. In my paper I will show that Davidson had no affinities whatsoever with Derrida and that the rapprochement exploited the immense prestige of an analytic philosopher to make continental philosophy and literary theory salonfähig.

Christopher Campbell, Glendon College, York University (Toronto)

‘Wittgenstein's letter to Russell and the significance of 'N($\bar{\xi}$)'

In response to a doubt Russell raised concerning §6 of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein writes in a letter of 1919, “You are quite right in saying that “N($\bar{\xi}$)” may also be made to mean $\sim p \vee \sim q \vee \sim r \vee \dots$. But this doesn't matter! I suppose you don't understand the notation of ' $\bar{\xi}$ '. It does not mean ‘for all values of $\bar{\xi}$...’. These lines have engendered puzzlement and misunderstanding among commentators concerning both the involvement of truth-functionality in general propositions and the meaning of the barred variable. I seek to explain the lines and reconcile them with the text of the *Tractatus*, along the way arguing against some of the contrary commentary. Among other things, this will shed some light on the difference of view between Russell and Wittgenstein concerning the relation between general and singular discourse.

Matt Carlson, Wabash College
'Quine on Logical Commitment'

Quine famously holds that our discourse engenders ontological commitments. I aim to show that he also holds that our discourse engenders logical commitments; in particular, commitments to accepting logical laws. I show how these logical commitments parallel ontological commitments in several important ways, including the roles played by regimentation and by theoretical virtues. I argue that this notion of logical commitment helps to make sense of Quine's reasons for accepting classical logic over other known alternatives.

Wouter Cohen, Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge
'Russell's existential struggles 1910-1914'

From 1918-1919 on, Russell explicitly holds that existence is a property of propositional functions. His route to that position was not at all straightforward. In this talk, I argue that Russell's theory of existence in the period 1910-1914 was in fact inconsistent with his theory of acquaintance, although he never appears to have realised it. I also provide a diagnosis: Russell fell into the inconsistency because he was dealing with existence in two contexts (negative existentials and the status of universals) which he treated as separate and so failed to connect them. Finally, I show how the inconsistency is resolved in Russell's mature theory of existence.

Paolo Degiorgi, Boston University

‘Hylomorphism in Kant’s and early Wittgenstein’s accounts of mathematics’

Proposition 6.233 from Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* has been read as a rejection of the Kantian claim that mathematics relies on intuition. I argue that much of the comparative work on the conceptions of mathematics at play in Kant’s theoretical philosophy and Wittgenstein’s early work has overlooked a fundamental affinity at play in the two oeuvres, one that shows how the two had a similar understanding of what kind of account mathematics calls for. I focus on a structural similarity between the Tractarian notion of *Satz* (proposition) and the Kantian one of *Erkenntnis* (cognition), advancing that we can fruitfully read much of the fundamental terminology of the two works as the result of an analysis of these two notions in terms of form and matter. For instance, Kantian intuitions and concepts can be understood as the matter and the form of empirical cognition, respectively. Similarly, the notorious Tractarian distinction between sign and symbol can be read as a form-matter analysis of the significant proposition, or of one of its components. In both works, the authors draw further hylomorphic distinctions within each level of the abovementioned distinction in the paradigmatic cases of cognition/proposition.

I then notice that both the notion of cognition in the first *Critique* and that of proposition in the *Tractatus* are best understood by considering their paradigmatic forms: empirical cognition for Kant and the significant proposition for Wittgenstein. Other instances of cognitions/propositions are thus best accounted for as derivative or parasitic on the paradigmatic cases. I thus argue that Kant’s remarks on mathematical cognition and Wittgenstein’s treatment of mathematical ‘pseudo-propositions’ in the 6.2s should be read as operating within this hylomorphic conception of cognitions/propositions. In the last part of my talk, I focus on some striking similarities between the two accounts of mathematics and trace them back to their hylomorphic roots.

Michael Della Rocca, Yale University

‘The Original Sin of Analytical Philosophy’

This paper examines several crucial and influential episodes from early analytical philosophy in which Frege, Russell, Moore, and others play key roles. In each episode, the debate is, I argue, structurally analogous to the debate over Cartesian mind-body interaction. In particular, I argue that just as the Cartesian position in the interaction debate turns on whether the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) is rejected—Descartes, the great (as will become apparent) anti-rationalist, rejects the PSR in this case—so too the seminal positions taken up by these early analytical philosophers turn on the anti-rationalist denial of the PSR. Further and perhaps disturbingly, these seminal positions are thus as problematic as the problematic Cartesian position with regard to mind-body interaction.

Fons Dewulf, Tilburg University

‘Reinterpreting the Failure of Logical Empiricism through the Lens of van Fraassen’s Voluntarist Epistemology’

In this paper, I argue that Bas van Fraassen’s voluntarist reading of logical empiricism should play a central role in our understanding of the historical trajectory of the movement and its institutional failure. I claim that a voluntarist perspective on philosophy was the central motivating factor for Carnap and Reichenbach’s shared agenda in the 1930s and 1940s. I also show that this agenda failed from the 1950s onward in the USA, because Reichenbach and Carnap did not clearly develop their voluntarist meta-philosophy and failed to communicate its aims to their followers in the budding intellectual field of philosophy of science.

Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, California State University, Los Angeles

‘Silent Atop a Ladder: Wittgenstein and Beckett on the Limits of Language’

This paper is concerned with exploring the affinities between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the works of Samuel Beckett. In the first -- historical and exegetical -- part of the paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* influenced Beckett's early and middle period. In the second -- philosophical -- part of the paper, I develop an understanding of the *Tractatus* by drawing on Beckett's literary technique. Rather than flatly senseless, we can understand the *Tractatus* as a literary work: the propositions are not literally true but nonetheless manage to express ideas, in virtue of constituting an oblique, but internally consistent, fiction.

Louis Doulas, University of California, Irvine

‘Of Tables and the Atomic Theory: Susan Stebbing on Ordinary Language and Scientific Language’

The goals of this paper are twofold. The first is to provide an account of how Stebbing conceived of the relationship between ordinary language and scientific language (especially in her *Philosophy and the Physicists* (1937) and “Some Puzzles about Analysis” (1938/39)). The second is to explore Stebbing's relationship to ordinary language philosophy (OLP) as a whole. The historiography here is underdeveloped and has mostly gone unquestioned (later Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin are thought to be its main protagonists). I argue, however, that Stebbing's work may have prefigured some of the argumentative strategies thought to be characteristic of OLP.

Sean Dudley, University of Toronto

‘Peirce, Frege, and Wilhelm Schlötel: Plagiarism and priority in the history of modern logic’

It is well-known that Peirce and Frege invented modern logic at the end of the nineteenth century. Few know that both authors were accused of plagiarism by the same man, one Wilhelm Schlötel. I use Schlötel's priority claims as a case study in the history of logic to provide a window onto the wider controversy racking German academic logic in the period. Although it is unlikely that either Peirce or Frege was familiar with Schlötel's work, his story shows us that the quantificational revolution associated with these authors was the culmination of a much longer program of logical reform.

Gary Ebbs, Indiana University Bloomington

‘Reading Quine’s claim that the two dogmas of modern empiricism are at root identical’

In section 5 of “Two Dogmas” Quine claims that the belief in a fundamental analytic-synthetic distinction and the belief that “it is significant in general to speak of the confirmation and infirmation of a statement” are “at root identical.” Carnap’s official view, however, is that it makes sense to speak of confirmation and infirmation of statements only from the standpoint of a language system for which an analytic-synthetic distinction has been clearly defined, hence not in general. Quine knew this. Why then does he claim that the two beliefs (dogmas) are at root identical? The key to the answer is to see that in section 4 of “Two Dogmas,” Quine takes himself to have shown that Carnap’s efforts to draw an analytic-synthetic distinction are unsuccessful by Carnap’s own standards. The best explanation of Carnap’s failure to realize that his efforts to defend and clarify the first dogma are unsuccessful, Quine thinks, is that he is steadfastly committed to the second one.

Joshua Eisenthal, California Institute of Technology

‘Back to the Problem of Space’

Following Reich (1992), Stachel (2007) has argued that a non-metrical notion of affine transport was developed “postmaturely” - although the mathematical and conceptual resources were all available by the 1880s, the notion lay dormant and undeveloped until the 1920s. Furthermore, Stachel has argued that the absence of this notion had serious consequences for the discovery and development of General Relativity. In this paper, I explore a different consequence of this historical lacuna. In particular, I consider what difference a non-metrical notion of affine transport might have made for the nineteenth century “Problem of Space”.

Mauro Engelmann, Federal University of Minas Gerais

‘The Significance of a Negation: Wittgenstein, Mauthner, and the Kraus Circle’

Whereas Sluga (2004) approximates Wittgenstein to Mauthner to the extent of transforming Wittgenstein in a kind of Pyrrhonian skeptic in the *Tractatus*, Nordman thinks that the philosophy of the *Tractatus* differs profoundly from that of Mauthner because it is *anti-skeptical* (2005: 117-120). Of course, these opposite judgments depend on how Wittgenstein and Mauthner are understood and compared. But can they be compared at all? What seems to justify comparisons between them is the very short and parenthetical remark in the *Tractatus* (TLP 4.0031) and certain words used by both, such as ‘tautology’. Of course, Wittgenstein’s short parenthetical remark tells us that he has nothing to do with Mauthner, which seems to suggest that they should not be compared. Concerning words used by both, such as ‘ladder’, ‘inexpressible’, ‘silence’ and ‘mysticism’, it is worth remembering that they do not carry their meaning with them regardless of their contexts of use (TLP: 3.3). It is obvious, for example, that, in Tractarian terms, Mauthner did not know why sentences of logic are tautologies. In section 2 I look into some contexts of the words ‘silence’ and ‘inexpressible’.

Nonetheless, one might think that the use of common words has a deeper and larger context, namely, Viennese/German culture. Although the authors mentioned above do not discuss Mauthner’s role in the Viennese context, they may see themselves in an unspoken agreement with the work that has had the greatest impact on the understanding of Wittgenstein’s Viennese background: Janik and Toulmin’s *Wittgenstein’s Vienna* (1973). In their classic work, Janik and Toulmin targeted deeper coincidences between Wittgenstein and Mauthner regarding what they saw as typical Viennese problems. They tell us a very detailed story about Mauthner’s significance for the *Tractatus* grounded in the most extensive study of the relevance of the broad Viennese cultural context in Wittgenstein’s work. In this context, they argue, the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Mauthner are distinct, but both respond to a common Viennese problem that Mauthner had formulated clearly: the distinction between facts and value opening the doors to mysticism. This story deserves to be re-examined, because it is indeed undeniable that the Viennese cultural context is relevant for the understanding of the *Tractatus*. [3]

In this paper, I intend to revisit the role that Janik and Toulmin attributed to Mauthner’s views in the philosophy of the *Tractatus*. My major goal is to argue for a rather significant change of perspective in elucidating the reference to Mauthner in the book. The question to be asked is not “What is the similarity between the projects of Mauthner and the *Tractatus*?” but “Why did Wittgenstein take the trouble to deny that his *Sprachkritik* could be somehow related to

Mauthner's?" I argue that the significance of the negation does not lie, as Janik and Toulmin think, in the strategies of Mauthner and Wittgenstein concerning facts and value, but in its possible role in the context of the "Kraus Circle", in which Mauthner was seen as a representative of European moral superficiality and decline in the early 20th century.

Rose Ryan Flinn, New York University

‘Informative Identity Statements’

The statement “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is potentially informative. Someone who understands the sentence needn’t know it to be true. It is usually said that this is because the names “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” differ semantically. Although they co-refer, the meanings of the names differ in ways that go beyond merely stylistic variation. This explanation is unsatisfying for one fairly obvious reason, which is that it fails to generalize. After all, it is also possible to be informed by the sentence “Andy Murry is Muzza”. Someone who has been introduced to the names in sufficiently different contexts needn’t know that the sentence is true. However, in being a nickname for Andy Murry, “Muzza” *would* seem to be a merely stylistic variation of his birthname, with the difference between them resembling the difference between the pair “lunch” and “luncheon”. This comes out in the fact that once we are apprised of the identity between Muzza and Andy Murray, the two names become interchangeable for us (again, stylistic considerations aside). This contrasts with how matters stand with “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”. In their case, the contexts of correct use associated with each expression are different. As McDowell notes,

[i]f someone used the two names indifferently in talking about Venus, so that we could find no interesting correlation between utterances containing “Hesperus” and (say) beliefs formed in response to evening appearances of the planet, and between utterances containing “Phosphorus” and beliefs formed in response to its morning appearances, then he would not be displaying competence in our use of the names. (McDowell 1977, 176).

Thus, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” differ semantically in a way that “Muzza” and “Andy Murray” do not. Nevertheless, in each case the possibility of an informative identity statement is live. Matters get even more interesting when we turn attention to the sorts of examples that Kripke presented us with (Kripke 1979). Suppose that Peter, who knows a Polish statesman called “Paderewski”, comes to learn of a famous pianist who goes by the same name. It is news to Peter that Paderewski the statesman is the same person as Paderewski the pianist. Here, an identity statement in which *exactly* the same name occurs on either side of the identity symbol – “Paderewski is Paderewski” – appears to be capable of informing Peter. What is going on in all these cases? In this paper, I give a uniform explanation of the possibility of informative identity statements that is applicable across the board.

Juliet Floyd, Boston University

‘Dreben is Dreben but the History of Dreben is Scholarship’

I face two commissioned projects to write on Dreben, and am seeking aid and responses in choosing themes and arguments. First, I am to write an essay “Wittgenstein and Dreben” for a multivolume work edited by Kemp and Hosseinkhani, *Wittgenstein and N*. Second, I am writing an essay responding to the transcript of the 1986 Stanford meeting at which Quine, Davidson, Dreben and Føllesdaal discussed the issue of empirically equivalent systems of the world and many other issues central to Quine. This will be published in a special issue of *The Journal of the History of Analytical Philosophy* co-edited by Benjamin Marschall and Andreas Føllesdaal.

Themes I shall discuss include the context of Dreben’s extant writings on Wittgenstein, the nature and significance of his philosophical relationship to Wittgenstein and to Quine as it evolved over time, and Dreben’s relation to Davidson as a reader of Quine, particularly on ascriptions of belief and observation sentences. Comments and suggestions will be welcome.

Sebastien Gandon, Blaise Pascal University

‘Feng Youlan on Wittgenstein’

In his *Xinzhuyan* (新知言), written in 1946, the Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan (冯友兰) draws a comparison between Chan Buddhism and Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. This kind of comparison has been made many times, without reference to Feng, in Wittgensteinian scholarship since the 1980s. The purpose of my talk is to explain why the reading presented by Feng, which is based on a global reinterpretation of what he called the "spirit of Chinese philosophy", is quite original and, in a way, more defensible than the later interpretations.

Yael Gazit, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

‘From Rorty’s Anti-Authoritarianism to Authority All the Way Down’

In Robert Brandom’s recent book, *Pragmatism and Idealism: Rorty and Hegel on Representation and Reality* (2022), Richard Rorty is portrayed as fundamentally Brandomian. In Brandom’s reading, Rorty’s Anti-Authoritarianism already implicitly includes all that is needed for a full-blown Brandomian picture, even though a crucial final (Brandomian-)Hegelian step is missing. This paper focuses on the concept of authority that stands at the heart of this account, by looking, in particular, at the seemingly unrelated question of Brandom’s mode of engagement with past philosophes that stands in the background. Examining Brandom’s short remark about Rorty’s similar approach to the history of philosophy, and casting what is at stake in terms of authority, will be shown to throw new light on both.

‘Between Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy. Husserl and the Lvov-Warsaw School’

According to the widely accepted view, the Lvov-Warsaw School (henceforth LWS) represents Polish analytical philosophy (Skolimowski 1967; Woleński 1989). However, not only the roots of the LWS but also some of its developments are not necessarily characteristic of the early analytical tradition. Due to Brentano’s and Twardowski’s influence, many members of the LWS developed their ideas within the scope of descriptive psychology. Additionally, Twardowski’s students were well acquainted with Husserl’s early philosophy because *Logical Investigations* were discussed during seminars (Twardowski, 2002).

Although research about the LWS has a long tradition, the main interest is still directed toward its achievements in the field of logic (Mulligan et al., 2014; Brożek et al., 2017). The relationship between Brentano and the LWS is also thoroughly covered (Betti, 2017; Woleński, 2017; Brożek, 2020). The history of descriptive psychology and its role in the LWS is recently gaining more attention (Rzepa, 1997; Płotka, 2020). However, little is known about the relationship between Husserl and the LWS, except for the studies of Olech (2020) and Płotka (2017, 2021).

The aim of this talk is to explore the interrelations between the philosophy of the LWS and early phenomenology. I argue that none of the philosophical schools developing analytical philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century were as involved with Husserl’s philosophy as the LWS. In the environment of the LWS, at least eight philosophers responded to Husserl’s philosophy: Twardowski (1912), Łukasiewicz (1904), Leśniewski (1929), Tatarkiewicz (1918), Ajdukiewicz (1931), Kotarbińska (1972), Ginsberg (1929, 1931), and Blaustein (1928; 1928-1929; 1930; 1938). It is important to note that philosophers from the LWS were mainly interested in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, with the exception of Blaustein, who studied *Ideas I*. In addition, each one of them was concerned with different elements of Husserl’s thought.

My research shows that LWS's philosophy is internally complex and embraces various ways of approaching philosophical problems. The interests of the members of the LWS went beyond mathematical logic and analysis of concepts. They explored descriptive psychology and elements of phenomenology. In that way, I highlight the side of the LWS that definitely deserves more attention.

Dirk Greimann, Universidade Federal Fluminense

‘What Exactly Is the Definiendum of the Truth Definitions to Which Frege’s Indefinability Thesis Refers?’

In his first Logical Investigation, “The Thought”, Frege affirms that truth is indefinable. My aim in this talk is to contribute to the clarification of this thesis, which has puzzled many of Frege’s readers. The main question to be tackled is what exactly the definiendum of the definitions discussed by Frege would be. I shall argue that the proper definiendum is neither the sense nor the reference of the predicate “is true” and its cognates like “is the True” or “denotes the True”, but the judgement-stroke and its counterpart in natural language, which Frege calls the “form of the assertoric sentence”.

Martin Gustafsson, Åbo Akademi University

‘The decomposition of thoughts’

Readers of Frege are understandably puzzled about his claim that “[a] thought is decomposable in many ways”. According to a moderate interpretation, Frege does not deny that a thought has one fundamental and unique structure. Rather, his point is just that this structure can be parsed in different ways depending on what specific inferential connections we want to highlight. On a more radical reading, Frege’s claim is that thoughts have no fundamental, unique structure but only a plurality of different but equally correct analyses. Michael Dummett defends a version of the moderate interpretation, arguing that Frege is working with two different notions: *analysis*, which reveals the unique inner structure which needs to be apprehended in order to grasp the thought, and *decomposition*, which only aims at clarifying specific inferential patterns and which can therefore be done in different ways. Others – such as Peter Geach, James Levine, and, most recently, Charles Travis – have defended varieties of the more radical interpretation. Travis denies that Frege’s conception involves anything like analysis in Dummett’s sense, arguing that “the whole point of [Fregean analysis/decomposition] is to provide laws of logic something to govern”, and that therefore “no decomposition [...] enjoys objective priority”.

In this paper, I argue that *even* if we agree with Travis that Dummett’s distinction between analysis and decomposition is spurious, it does not thereby follow that we can happily endorse the radical interpretation. Even if Fregean analysis/decomposition is fundamentally a matter of clarifying the inferential connections between thoughts (rather than of identifying a more fundamental inner structure which we must grasp in order to apprehend the thought), we still need the idea of one unique structure – at least as long as we conceive logical inference along lines that are central to Frege’s whole philosophical outlook.

Jonas Held, University of Leipzig

‘Wittgenstein on Moore’s Paradox and the Nature of Propositional Content’

Wittgenstein’s remarks on Moore’s paradox are often read as a discussion concerning the self-ascription of belief. What is not seen is that these remarks are also about the nature of propositional content. Revealing this side of Wittgenstein’s remarks will not only deepen his critique of the Fregean picture of propositional content we can already find in other parts of the *Philosophical Investigations*, but it will also be of help to systematically develop his own view of the nature of propositional content. Above this, interpreting Wittgenstein’s remarks on Moore’s paradox in this direction will cast some light on certain passages that otherwise stay incomprehensible.

Konstantin Hokamp, Europa Universität-Viadrina

‘Aurel Kolnai – From a value-based theory of negative emotions to the modes of Aversion: A story of conversion?’

A comparison of Aurel Kolnai’s work on negative emotions as a self-described phenomenologist and his later work on the same subject as a faculty member of Bedford College. Based on that comparison I will problematize the term ‘realistic phenomenology’ and its similarity to analytic philosophy, especially of the Ordinary Language variety.

Jim Hutchinson, Nazarbayev University

‘The ‘Psychological’ in Frege’

I evaluate three recent interpretations of Frege's injunction against anything "psychological" in logic. First: the "straightforward" interpretation, which takes all aspects of human activities as psychological. Second: the "perspectival" interpretation, which understands the psychological in terms of a third-person perspective. Third: the "methodological" interpretation, which understands the psychological in terms of certain characteristic methods of discovery. I argue that on the straightforward interpretation, Frege violates his own injunction too often and too obviously; while the perspectival interpretation cannot explain why he counts certain aspects of ideas as psychological. Not sharing these problems, the methodological interpretation looks best.

David Hyder, University of Ottawa

‘Goodman’s “New Riddle of Induction” and the Problem of Time’

The New Riddle first appeared in Goodman’s 1946 “A Query on Confirmation” along with a number of variants, including a statistical version due to Hempel. In this talk, I will consider both Goodman’s and Hempel’s paradoxes with a focus on the role of time, both as it appears in the definitions of the problematic predicates, and in its role as the generator of the inductive problem itself. In conclusion, it will be argued that *admitting* such predicates is tantamount to denying the logical independence of elementary predicates and propositions, meaning that the logical source of the difficulty can be situated in the theory of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*.

Asher Jiang, Tsinghua University

‘How not to make Carnap a Neo-Carnapian’

Typically, Neo-Carnapians like Hirsch and Thomasson advocate for some form of metaontological deflationism. Also, they usually perceive themselves as inheriting Carnap’s own deflationist conception. However, I argue that Hirsch has failed to recognize some fundamental differences between himself and Carnap. The same applies to Thomasson. These historical issues are systematically relevant. Carnap’s original doctrine is free of numerous flaws that are attributed to Hirsch. Thomasson’s approach is more limited in its application than Carnap’s own conception.

Jiang Yi, Shanxi University

‘On the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy in China and its Holistic Characteristics in Modern Chinese Philosophy’

With the eastward expansion of Western philosophy, analytic philosophy entered China, conflicted and merged with traditional Chinese philosophy, changed the historical trends of the Chinese intellectual tradition, and resulted in a new picture of modern Chinese philosophy. To better understand the past and present of the philosophy, we must carefully examine the development of analytic philosophy in China. The historical investigation and philosophical explanation of analytic philosophy in China in the 20th century are essential to studying modern Chinese philosophy. The study of analytic philosophy in China can be roughly divided into two categories. The first attempts a historical description of analytic philosophy in China in the 20th century. The second explores the methodological significance and theoretical construction of analytic philosophy in Chinese philosophy. This article attempts to show the history of analytic philosophy entering China and to reveal the holistic characteristics of Chinese analytic philosophy by examining the interaction between analytic philosophy and Chinese philosophy, and the influence of analytic philosophy on modern Chinese philosophy by the eastward expansion of Western philosophy to China at the beginning of the 20th century.

Oscar Joffe, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

‘Elucidation, History, and the Paradox of Analysis in Frege's ‘Logic in Mathematics’

I present a reading of Frege's treatment of a form of the paradox of analysis in his posthumously published paper 'Logic in Mathematics.' Frege's way with the paradox leads to a tension which emerges in his notorious remarks on a misty grasp of sense. I discuss this tension in light of his remarks on the distinction between history and system, and suggest that the resulting considerations point to further demands on his notion of elucidation.

Alexander Johnstone, University of Pittsburgh

‘Judgement, Universalism, and Reference-failure’

The aim of this talk will be to clarify the nature of the difficulties generated, for Frege's philosophy, by the possibility of reference-failure. I will engage with two problems: *the problem of truth-valueless thoughts*, and *the problem of logic's independent applicability*. I will argue that, for Frege, the problem of truth-valueless thoughts is less threatening than many (e.g. Conant and McDowell) have taken it to be. I will then present the problem of logic's independent applicability. Although it has received less notice than the first, it is more threatening.

Alexander Klein, McMaster University

‘James, Epiphenomenalism, and the Hard Problem’

In one of his earliest publications, William James developed an evolutionary objection to epiphenomenalism. This objection is still discussed in today's philosophy of mind. In a nutshell, he argued that if epiphenomenalism were true, then there could be no scientifically credible account of how consciousness evolved. This argument did not garner much attention when James first brought it forward in his 1879 “Are We Automata?” T. H. Huxley was a major target. But he never seriously engaged James's work, nor did Herbert Spencer or William Clifford, two other important targets. James's objection was revived a century later. Starting with a 1982 essay by Frank Jackson on “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” epiphenomenalists have sought to respond to the kinds of evolutionary worries James raised. But they have typically entertained only a superficial version of James's actual objection. I will offer a more historically accurate account of the objection, showing the actual objection to be more powerful than has previously been understood. And I will draw from more recent philosophy of biology to show that his objection remains formidable even today. Finally, I will show that a corollary of James's evolutionary argument is that the distinction philosophers now draw between phenomenal- and access-consciousness is not viable. Since the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness depends on this distinction, James's evolutionary objection to epiphenomenalism, if successful, would have the surprising consequence of showing that today's hard problem may not be well formed.

Roland Krause, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
'Wittgenstein on guidance: intentionalist causalism'

I investigate how the later Wittgenstein's account of rule-following relates to the longstanding debate between intentionalist and causalist accounts of intentional action. Central to both discussions is the question of how the notion of guidance respectively either by a rule or by an intention is to be understood. On first glance, Wittgenstein appears to be a paradigm intentionalist and anti-causalist about rule-guided behavior. Against this, I argue that Wittgenstein is both an intentionalist and a causalist. More precisely, he coherently argues on intentionalist grounds for an account of rule-guided behavior as the exercise of a strongly emergent power.

Gregory Lavers, Concordia University
'Fitch's paradox, Popper, Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle'

Fitch's paradox of knowability is considered in the context of some early criticisms of verificationist theories of meaning. It is shown that in the context of what I call *Popper's observation*, a certain restriction on the verifiability principle is suggested. It is then shown that the same restriction avoids Fitch's paradox. So the lesson the verificationists, and likely other anti-realists, need to draw from this paradox is no stronger than what they ought already accept in accordance with Popper's observation. The restriction strategy suggested is then compared with others discussed in the literature.

Gregory Landini, University of Iowa
'Time without Events'

Presentism is said to proclaim that only present events exist, while Eternalism embraces more. Such positions should not require 'exists' to be a property. But do temporal relations require events? Russell and Whitehead split on whether special relativity requires a static (vs dynamic) Eternalist philosophy of space-time events. I argue that tenseless characterizations produce the static image of events standing (tenselessly) in an external ordering. Introducing a language L_t where all and only primitive predicates are tense inflected and tenselessness comes *solely* with quantifiers+particles, I argue for special relativity without events and a lockstep non-Eternalist physical time.

Richard Lawrence, University of Vienna
'Frege, Formalism, and the Kantian Legacy'

I will develop an interpretation of the formalist view of arithmetic in Frege's context and discuss its influence on later analytic philosophy. To do so, I will argue that this formalism stems largely from Kant's philosophy of mathematics. I will focus especially on interpreting Kant's so-called "Prize Essay", where he discusses the role of signs in mathematics at length. Seen in the context of Kant's views, 19th century formalism was not a silly position that confused numbers with physical marks, but a viable view that could occupy the dominant position which Frege perceived it to have.

Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau, University of Graz
'Russell's Causal Theory of Meaning and its Reception in the Vienna Circle'

In 1929/30 Carnap and Neurath criticized the picture theory of meaning of the *Tractatus* and the mysterious status of "elucidations". In this context they turned to causal theories of meaning which were able to explain in physicalist terms the relation of expressions to what they are about. Russell's causal theory of meaning as presented in "An Outline of Philosophy" (1927) became particularly interesting for them and was a source for Carnap's behavioristic explanation of language (Carnap 1931 and 1932). I will explain the relevance of Russell's causal theory for Carnap and compare it to his own causal theory of language.

Alexander Linsbichler, Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Vienna
'Carnap's fact/value dichotomy as an alleged thought-stopper'

According to Putnam, logical empiricism's conception of value judgments exerted an immense and detrimental influence on public discourse and economics. The notion of a dichotomy between objective facts and subjective values allegedly renders different solutions to ethical problems merely a matter of taste. Hence, any discussion about ethical problems is deemed futile. "The worst thing about the fact/value dichotomy is that in practice it functions [...] not just as a discussion-stopper, but a thought-stopper (Putnam 2002, 44)." This paper reconstructs Carnap's non-cognitivism as a relativized, semantic version of the fact/value dichotomy and defends Carnap's account against most of Putnam's criticisms.

Benjamin Marschall, Trinity College, Cambridge

‘Does Carnap Need a Criterion of Analyticity?’

Everyone knows that Carnap wants to draw a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. He characterises analyticity in terms of what follows from the linguistic rules of constructed frameworks. It has been contentious, however, whether Carnap assumes that such frameworks can be adopted by speakers. If so, then Carnap requires a criterion of analyticity that determines whether a speaker has committed herself to using the rules of a particular framework. I defend the need for such a criterion against some recent critics, by arguing that it is required to make sense of Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics.

Sofia Miguens, University of Porto

‘There is nothing else to think but that p ’ – Anscombe and Diamond on rational capacities’

Centering on Diamond's 2019 book *Reading Wittgenstein With Anscombe, Going On to Ethics* and the interpretation of a debate between David Wiggins and Bernard Williams therein, I discuss whether Diamond’s approach to ethics does away with unbridgeable ‘gulfs between us’ (in Wittgenstein’s expression). For that I analyze Diamond’s idea of a distance beyond argumentative disagreement in terms of two types of disagreement, one concerning going on applying our concepts, and another concerning making sense anew. Throughout I engage in a discussion of Kuusela 2021 interpretation of Diamond on asymmetries in thought and the logical role of thinking guides.

Nikolay Milkov, University of Paderborn

‘Wittgenstein and Hegel as Idealistic Philosophers’

For years, Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* was interpreted as a work in metaphysics. Recent studies demonstrated, however, that the Tractarian objects were only introduced in order to make the logic of depiction understandable. Similarly to Wittgenstein, Hegel only discussed the categories in order to lay down the hypothetical structure of what is thinkable (intelligible). Following this argument, Hegel and Wittgenstein maintained that philosophy explores thinking/language. However, thinking/language it is already there; it is not synthetic, must not be first discovered. This makes philosophy analytical in principle.

Robert Myers, York University (Toronto)

‘Actions, *Normative* Reasons, and Causes’

Although Donald Davidson is better known for his account of motivating reasons, he did write about what we now call normative reasons, propounding a sort of non-reductive naturalism modelled on his anomalous monism. Much as he claimed that motivating reasons can causally generate people’s actions without compromising their agency, he claimed that normative properties can causally generate people’s motivating reasons while retaining their prescriptive authority. I begin by defending this claim against some familiar metaphysical worries about causality, supervenience, and grounding, before considering whether it can be squared with Davidson’s own views about pro-attitudes and normative beliefs.

Matthias Neuber, Johannes-Gutenberg-University Mainz

‘American Critical Realism and the Mind-Body Problem’

I will take a closer look at American critical realism with special reference to the mind-body problem. It will be shown that there existed two factions on this problem within the critical realist movement. While C. A. Strong (1918) and Durant Drake (1925) argued in terms of panpsychism, Roy Wood Sellars (1932) advocated a physicalist solution. My central thesis is that it was Sellars who, albeit officially no friend of analytic philosophy, paved the way for both his son's Wilfred and Herbert Feigl's views with his physicalist approach, and that his contribution therefore needs to be given greater consideration in the historiography of analytic philosophy than has been the case to date.

Carsten Fogh Nielsen, University of Southern Denmark

‘Revisiting the Sources. Anscombe, Foot and the origin story of contemporary virtue ethics’

In my talk I will revisit the main arguments of three seminal papers by Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot from the late 1950s. These papers are often cited as laying the foundation for the emergence of contemporary virtue ethics. I argue that this claim is only partly true and should not be uncritically accepted. This in turn highlights the inextricably historical nature of many contemporary definitions of virtue ethics.

Gilad Nir, University of Potsdam

‘Wittgenstein and the Paradox of Verificationism’

In recoiling from mathematical realism, the middle Wittgenstein gravitates towards the verificationist view that the meaning of a mathematical conjecture resides in its proof. But if that is so, he notes, we cannot be said to understand the conjecture before it is proven. And this seems to render inexplicable the fact that mathematicians do try to prove it. This paper is concerned with the shape and consequences of this dialectic. I argue that in seeking to steer clear of both realism and verificationism, Wittgenstein advances a radically different approach to mathematical meaning, which brings into view the temporal, historical and creative dimensions of our use of language.

Francesco Orilia, Università di Macerata

‘Russell’s Transition from Directionalism to Positionalism and the Current Debate on Relations’

There is now a lively debate on the nature of relations spurred by Fine’s seminal paper “Neutral Relations” (2000), which distinguishes the standard view, positionalism, and anti-positionalism. Both the standard view and positionalism can be traced back to Russell, in *Principles of Mathematics*, and in *Theory of Knowledge*, respectively. However, Russell avoids the problems that Fine sees in positionalism. Moreover, positionalism can be further improved, so as to provide a more satisfactory account of converse relations.

Thomas Raysmith, Touro University Berlin

‘Showing, Not Saying, Negation and Falsehood: Establishing Kimhi’s Two-Way Logical Capacities
with Wittgenstein’s Samples’

In his book, *Thinking and Being*, Irad Kimhi attempts to make negation and falsehood intelligible by depicting assertions and facts both as acts of two-way logical capacities – i.e., capacities for positive and negative assertions and facts. Kimhi’s philosophy faces severe problems. As Jean-Philippe Narboux has pointed out, to articulate his philosophy, Kimhi relies on ostensive assertions involving negation that he cannot account for. Additionally, Kimhi does not explain why, as he admits, sometimes negative facts (e.g., the book is not blue) hold in virtue of positive facts (e.g., the book is red) holding. I build on Kimhi’s notion of two-way logical capacities to elaborate a novel way of understanding predicative assertions and their negations and falsehood. I argue that we can make such negation and falsehood intelligible, and avoid the problems Kimhi’s philosophy faces, by (1) seeing two-way logical capacities as established by our treating things as what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls “samples”, and (2) taking there to be some non-truth-apt normative assertions that, amongst other things, *show* the rules for making predicative assertions.

Erich Reck, University of California, Riverside

‘Anti-Psychologism and Philosophical Method: From Frege to Wittgenstein’

It is well known that Wittgenstein developed many of his views in response to Frege’s works, both in his early and his later writings. This includes clear disagreements between the two philosophers, but also some important agreements, although the latter are often ignored or misunderstood. In this talk I will argue that a core agreement between them concerns not particular philosophical theses and arguments but their general method in philosophy; and this is directly related to the kinds of anti-psychologism that drive their works.

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Thomas Ricketts, University of Pittsburgh

‘Moderate Resolution and the General Propositional Form’

Moderate resolute readers of the TLP—for example, Cora Diamond and James Conant—hold that that the TLP conceives of philosophy as an activity of clarification. A principal instrument of clarification is a hypothesized Tractarian begriffsschrift, and the scaffolding for this begriffsschrift is the general propositional form. My question is this: how is the TLP, resolutely read, intended to lead an understanding reader to recognize the variable set forth in 6 to be the general propositional form?

I suggest that the story the TLP appears to tell about picturing and logic is, in a sort of aspect-shift, to lead the reader to see the general form in the propositions of her own language. I argue that this aspect-shift survives the recognition of the Tractarian story to be nonsensical. Finally, I maintain that Wittgenstein thinks that just in uncovering the general form, he had essentially solved the problems of philosophy.

Amedeo Robiolio, King's College London

'Trust Yourself, or Trust Your Self?'

The Moorean shift — the notion that 'here is one hand' refutes scepticism about the external world — is implausible, because is grounded in a context independent version of the 'linguistic turn' that does not take into account the two different senses in which we think of ourselves, i.e. first-personal and third-personal. But Moore's paradox (p and I do not believe p) demonstrates that this difference is genuine. A context-bound version of the linguistic turn which does account for this difference, such as Wittgenstein's in *On Certainty*, does not allow for an unrestricted Moorean shift.

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Tabea Rohr, Laboratoire de Linguistique Formelle (Paris)

'Frege, Plücker and the Function-Argument Distinction'

Tappenden (1995) and Wilson (1992, 2005) mention the hypothesis that Frege took the idea that sentences can be carved up in different ways from Plücker's analytic proof of the principle of duality. In this paper we show, firstly, that a closer analysis of Plücker's text supports this hypothesis. Secondly, we will argue, that unlike Tappenden (1995, 445) indicates, Frege's distinction between concepts of different orders did not originate from Plücker.

Jacob Rump, Creighton University

‘What the community expects when it is expecting: Wittgenstein on rule-following, judging, and collective intentionality’

Kripke’s solution to Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox rejects ascriptions of meaning to individual mental states or speaker’s intentions, and relies instead on the notion of community expectations—a form of *collective intentions* regarding how *we expect* others to behave. It is expectations at the community level that provide the success conditions according to which individual acts of linguistic usage are (holistically and over time) judged. When the community judges that a deviant individual is not following its rules, they are judging that the deviant is not behaving (linguistically) as he *should*. Like disappointed parents, the community is judging that the individual has not met their *expectations*, even in cases where those expectations were not made explicit. But if individual speaker’s intentions are off the table, and intentions are not to be construed in terms of individual mental activities, how do these communal intentions get off the ground? How do we get collective intentions without presupposing individual intentions and how do they function in cases where they are not made explicit? Focusing on remarks in the *Philosophical Investigations* on judgment, measuring, and intention, and with reference to recent work on judgment in Frege, I develop an alternative interpretation of collective intentions in Wittgenstein as *a form of collective intentionality* manifested in logical-normative community practice-types, tokened in individual acts of judging, where the success conditions for community expectations are interpreted as intentional fulfillment conditions.

Twan Stiekel, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

‘Paul F. Linke on Metaphysical Realism’

Paul F. Linke (1876-1955) was a philosopher in the time just before analytic and continental philosophy parted ways. On the one hand, he was among Husserl’s first generation of students and a proponent of the phenomenological movement. On the other, he was also recognised as a representative of the burgeoning analytic movement, with a review in *Mind* likening Linke’s work to that of key figures in early analytic philosophy, such as Russell, Moore and Broad.

Like Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, Linke was interested in showing the limits of philosophy. Yet unlike the Vienna Circle, Linke didn’t exclude many problems from philosophy because he considered them to be pseudo-problems, but because he considered them to be empirical problems that were mistaken for philosophical ones. In this paper, I will focus on one such problem: the question of whether metaphysical realism is correct to maintain that the external world is largely made up of mind-independent objects. Why did Linke argue that this is an empirical question and does his argument hold up? Could this view help us respond to sceptical concerns?

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Fredrik Stjernberg, Linköping University, Sweden

‘Ramsey’s Goldilocks realism’

In Ramsey, we find a blend of realist and non-realist views. Ramsey’s basic attitude on many issues is an untroubled realism. But we also find examples of Ramsey endorsing anti-realist views, and these examples seem to become more prominent in his later writings. Here we find his attitudes on general propositions, on conditionals, and his developing views on mathematics. His attitude to Brouwerian intuitionism became more positive. Intuitionism went from a “Bolshevik menace” to an issue worth exploring.

My talk concerns how we are to find a way to combine these strands.

Hamid Taieb, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

‘Analytic Phenomenology: Past and Present’

The aim of this paper is to present a series of philosophical projects at the crossroad of the phenomenological tradition and analytic philosophy of mind and which aptly fall under (and sometimes designate themselves with) the label “analytic phenomenology”. In its first, historical part, it will explore works from the early phenomenologists Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, and Heinrich Hofmann. It will show that these philosophers thought of their theoretical endeavor as an analysis of phenomena (or of their essences). The second part of the paper will be devoted to the presentation of two paradigmatic contemporary positions in the philosophy of mind which combine phenomenology and analytic philosophy, namely those of Charles Siewert and Uriah Kriegel. As the paper will show, these two positions are different from the historical examples of analytic phenomenology: they are analytic not because they analyze phenomena (or their essences), but because they use theoretical insights from the phenomenological tradition, notably from Brentano and Husserl, while applying to them the dialectical methodology of analytic philosophy, that is, be clear, use arguments, etc. The paper will end with some general reflections about how analytic philosophy evolved in the last decades and how this impacted analytic phenomenology as well.

Xing Taotao, Peking University

‘Hao Wang on Predicativism’

Hao Wang’s search in the 1950s for a strong predicative set theory can be seen as part and parcel of his philosophical project to connect conceptualism and realism, taking predicativism as the joint. After the failure of the first attempt, which was proved too weak for the conceived connection, Wang proposed (though did not actually carried out) the plan to introduce generalized inductive definitions to go beyond the Church-Kleene recursive ordinals. This idea has normally been criticized as a distortion of predicativity, especially in face of the standard Feferman–Schütte characterization of the notion. However, a couple of philosophical issues are involved in how to understand predicativity, such as intuition vs. formalism, definability vs. provability, the apparently impredicative features of inductive definitions and the various forms of the Vicious Circle Principle, so that options are viable. It is argued that Wang’s broad notion of predicativity supports a strong form of predicativism, which fits well into his general conceptualist framework.

Benjamin Toth, University of Lisbon

‘Across the divide: Wittgenstein and Foucault’

This proposal to SSHAP 2023 explores some intellectual connections between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michel Foucault. It looks particularly at commonalities between the later Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations* and Foucault’s theoretical writing of the 1960s. Taking into account the disjunction between analytic and continental philosophy in the 1950s and 60s the paper asks about how and when Foucault became familiar with Wittgenstein; discusses commonalities between their perspectives; and examines Foucault’s account, in *Order of Things*, of the origin of analytic philosophy.

Tue Trinh, Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft

‘Logicity and the picture theory of language’

I argue that Wittgenstein's position on trivialities in the *Tractatus* is inconsistent, as it contains the following theses: (A) sentences are pictures; (B) trivialities are not pictures; (C) trivialities are sentences. A and B follow from the theory of language which Wittgenstein proposes, while C contradicts it. I conjecture that the reason for Wittgenstein's commitment to C is his inadequate transformative analysis of a class of natural language expressions. I discuss a way to overcome this inadequacy which has been made possible by recent advances in linguistic research.

Aviezer Tucker, Harvard University

‘Schlick’s Political Philosophy: *Nature and Culture* Today’

Schlick’s political philosophy proposed that the state is not necessarily territorial and that explicit social contracts may replace territorial sovereignty. This paper attempts to understand Schlick’s political philosophy within three contexts: Schlick’s own better known works in the philosophy of language and epistemology; the Austrian political and intellectual contexts of late Habsburg politics and the crisis of the thirties; and contemporary theory of the state and Panarchy.

Timur Cengiz Uçan, Université Bordeaux Montaigne

‘Description, Language, Other Minds, Reduction, and Phenomenology’

In this paper, I propose an assessment of constraints and challenges that arguably ought to be faced by contemporary analytic practices of phenomenology. Indeed, not only that some aspects were common to conceptions of phenomenology of the early XXth century, but also, aspects of phenomenologies have been inspirational, assumed or criticized by early analytic philosophers (notably as Austin, Cavell, and C.I. Lewis). Contemporary analytical conceptions of phenomenology can benefit from historical considerations regarding past achievements and difficulties encountered by past attempts of conceiving phenomenology.

Wim Vanrie, University of Ghent

‘Frege's anti-formalist, anti-syntactic conception of the sign’

This paper investigates how Frege’s critique of formalism hangs together with his conception of the sign, and what this teaches us about Frege's approach to logic. In that critique, Frege invokes a distinction between mere figures – which is what formalists have at their disposal – and signs proper, which have the aim of signifying. Properly understood, this distinction reveals that Frege’s conception of the sign is incompatible with a contemporary syntactic conception. From Frege’s point of view, the contemporary notion of an uninterpreted syntactic unit does not move beyond the formalist figure, and therefore must be rejected.

Claudine Verheggen, York University (Toronto)

‘Was Wittgenstein a Reductionist or a Quietist about Meaning?’

I argue that Wittgenstein was neither a reductionist nor a quietist about meaning. On the one hand, the remarks that are often invoked to support a reductionist reading are purely descriptive and thus not intended to support philosophically constructive views about meaning. On the other hand, the remarks that are often understood as supporting a quietist reading, especially those about agreement, can be seen as solving a problem that is left over after Wittgenstein has repudiated reductionism, and thus as providing philosophically constructive views about meaning.

Andreas Vrahimis, University of Cyprus

‘The analytic counter-revolution?: Russell on 'scientific philosophy' and 'evolutionism’

Comparative to the commonplace focus onto developments in mathematics and physics, the life sciences appear to have received relatively sparse attention within the history of analytic philosophy. This paper will ask: what motivated early analytic philosophers’ downplaying of the significance of the life sciences for philosophy? One possible answer to this question may be found in Russell’s critique of ‘evolutionism’ in his 1914 *Our Knowledge of the External World*.

Russell Wahl, Idaho State University

‘Russell and Poincaré: the question of intuition’

I discuss the important role in the Russell- Poincaré debate of their differences involving the nature of logic and the nature and role of intuition. I examine Poincaré’s various remarks on intuition, and his insistence that mathematical reasoning requires intuition, and Russell’s response to Poincaré where he does not deny the role of intuition, in at least one sense, in mathematics. I suggest that once we understand the difference between Russell’s view of logic and Poincaré’s, and recognize the role acquaintance with relations plays for Russell, we can see some common ground between the positions.

Simon Wimmer, Technical University Dortmund

‘Cook Wilson on Inference and Other Forms of Reasoning’

Cook Wilson rejects the view that inferences are sequences of judgements. He takes it to be motivated by a misleading analogy between language and thought, and offers two considerations against following that analogy. For Cook Wilson, an inference is knowledge that one’s premise facts necessitate one’s conclusion fact. This view, however, fails to cover many cases of reasoning. Cook Wilson’s views of forms of reasoning besides inference draw on his accounts of hypothetical statement, opinion, and being under an impression. Given how differently Cook Wilson treats different forms of reasoning, he denies that they fall under a common kind.

Rachael Wiseman, University of Liverpool

‘Ordinary language is not a philosopher’

A question that's lately been bothering me is how to understand and historicize 'ordinary language philosophy'. Bluntly: who is in, and who is out; and why. Recently, this omnivorous label has come to be applied not just to J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle and their immediate circles, but to Wittgenstein and his followers, and indeed to any Oxford or Cambridge philosopher from the 1950s who showed an interest in linguistic practice, among them Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe. Of course, we can use labels however we want, but some uses illuminate and others obscure. In this instance, the wider use seems to me to certainly do the latter. To get into clear focus what is at stake here is difficult, but I want to say that the difference between Austin's and Wittgenstein's method is as deep as can be, and reflects a fundamental disagreement about human nature, language and reality, and about the status of metaphysics.

Yingjin Xu, Fudan University

‘Is Quine really naturalized enough?--Wang's metaphilosophical criticism of Quine revisited’

According to Wang Hao, Quine's philosophy is not "naturalized" enough as it appears to be due to the following considerations: Firstly, Quine's adherence to the first order logic looks very weird from a more scientific point of view, since natural scientists have a wider range of options concerning the constructing tools of their theories; secondly, though Quine's divergence from standard positivism leaves a larger space to define the term "experience" in Quine's framework, he surprisingly handles "experience" in a manner distancing himself from genuine empirical studies; thirdly, though Quine's holism, which is allied with his pragmatism, appears to be a big progress in the development of analytic philosophy, the whole holistic narrative here is too empty to make itself anchored in empirical studies in relevant areas.

Byeong-uk Yi, University of Toronto

‘Venn and Existential Import: Development of the Modern Doctrine of Categorical Propositions’

This article discusses Venn's contribution to the development of the modern doctrine of categorical propositions, which departs from the traditional doctrine by rejecting subalternation and holds that universal propositions do not have existential import while particular propositions do. Venn was an early proponent of the modern doctrine and made a significant contribution to its development by examining existential import of categorical propositions. While discussing his historical significance in the development of the modern doctrine, the article also argues that his argument for the doctrine had limitations, and that the limitations show problems it inherits from the traditional doctrine.

Symposia

Frege: The Pure Business of Being True

Charles Travis, University of Porto

Sanford Shieh, Wesleyan University

‘Possibility in the Pure Business of being True’

Is Frege opposed to modality? I discuss two ideas about how Frege, on Charles Travis’s recent interpretation, would be committed to modality. First, an important part of Travis’s reading is to show that Frege’s conception of thought, *Gedanke*, is not opposed to occasion-sensitivity. Does this induce relativity of truth and falsity to occasion? I argue that it does not. Occasion-sensitivity insists on the ineliminability of thinkers’ understandings in order for a particular thought to be grasped or expressed on any specific occasion. It does not insist that those thoughts are true or false relative to occasions. For Frege, as Travis and I both understand him, logic demands the absoluteness of truth of thoughts. Second, Travis takes Frege to hold that thoughts and concepts have, intrinsically, a certain apparently modal generality. They are ways for things to be, and so are instanced by indefinitely many distinct possible cases. I suggest that perhaps the ground for such a view lies in the existence of false thoughts. And I argue that if this is the basis of modal generality, it does not in fact require a primitive notion of possibility, but only of consistency with the laws of logic.

Jim Hutchinson, Nazarbayev University

‘Frege and the Fundamental Abstraction’

According to Charles Travis, a certain "abstraction" is "fundamental to Frege's whole view," since it is by this abstraction that Frege identifies his subject: the "pure business of being true." I raise questions about how this fundamental abstraction is meant to work, and in particular, how it is meant to figure in certain important arguments attributed by Travis to Frege. Ultimately, I suggest that philosophical problems with the fundamental abstraction's role in these arguments give us reason to doubt that Frege is committed to it at all.

Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement

Sanford Shieh, Wesleyan University

'Are Moore-Russell Propositions Intentional Representations?'

In *Analysis of Mind*, Russell claimed that he previously accepted a conception of "intentional inexistence" he attributes to Brentano. He clearly understood this conception through Meinong's writings. I show that in *Principles* this conception involves taking Moore-Russell propositions to be "assertions about" the logical subjects they contain. Hence Russell conceives of these propositions as representations, in one contemporary sense, of *how* these subjects are. Propositions are the fundamental representations; we judgers represent only in virtue of being related to propositions. I see no clear evidence that Russell was ever concerned with the question: what makes propositions representations? With the change to multiple-relations theories and the abandonment of propositions this does *not* change: representations are, primarily, judgment-complexes. A subject represents only derivatively, in virtue of occurring in judgment-complexes. It follows that, for Russell, the difficulties of specifying corresponding complexes for judgment-complexes are not magically dissolved by invoking some intentionality of the mind.

Gregory Landini, University of Iowa

'The world of Russell's MRTJ as I found it'