

# Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy (SSHAP)

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University of Connecticut & Wesleyan University

## Abstracts (in alphabetical order)

### Plenary Lectures

**Gregory Landini**

(Thursday, 2pm)

*The Impredicative Nature of Mathematics and Mind*

Whitehead and Russell Logicism has been misunderstood. We need a reset, a *Principia Mathematica Redux*. I have discovered that ramified types were never part of the formal work which embraces simple types and fully impredicative comprehension at \*12. While it embraces Frege's revolution (according to which cpLogic is an informative *a priori* science precisely by embodying impredicative comprehension), it also embraces the revolution within mathematics (according to which no branch of mathematics has abstract particulars as its subject matter). On this view, mathematicians study all the kinds of structures that are given by relations independently of any logical contingencies of their exemplification. Simple type scaffolding does not encumber revolutionary mathematics, which is not under oath to recover results wrought by the intuitions of the metaphysicians of abstract particulars. Frege's logicism rejected the revolution within mathematics, maintaining that numbers are objects. It is thus antithetical to the Whitehead- Russell logicist thesis that mathematicians are doing cpLogic when they do mathematics. The neo-Kantian question is then: What is mind that it knows cpLogic? Naturalists today build mind bottom-up from exemplified recursive functions, but such functions cannot capture the impredicative unbounded quantification of cpLogic. The only viable approach is top-down, whereby the minds that know mathematics are scaffolded by unbounded impredicative quantification together with an acquaintance with relations (in tension). Russell tried this in his 1913 *Theory of Knowledge* but reached an impasse. It will be argued that repairs can be made and that he was on the right track for capturing the impredicative nature of both mathematics and mind.

**Sandra Laugier**

(Friday, 2pm)

*An Anthropological Style in Analytic Philosophy*

Within the recent history of anthropology, the relations between this discipline and philosophy have been rearranged in various ways. It was with Kant's reversal of traditional metaphysics and his separation of knowledge from morality that anthropology claimed its title, and some versions of philosophical anthropology have emerged in the history of analytic philosophy. The later Wittgenstein's approach, as a philosophical method attentive to ordinary uses, or Willard Van Orman Quine's work on the effects of

translation on meaning and ontology are powerful examples of an “Anthropological Tone in Analytic Philosophy”. I will reexamine the concept of translation in the work of Quine and Wittgenstein, and discuss how an ordinary anthropology can address some of the challenges in the relation of analytic philosophy to anthropology.

**Ian Proops**

(Saturday 2pm)

*Kant and the Analytic Tradition: Some Points from the Transcendental Dialectic*

I argue that reflection on the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* can unearth points of potential interest to historians of analytic philosophy. I consider two topics in detail: (a) Kant’s flirtation with the idea that the metaphysical claims (or apparent claims) set in opposition in the mathematical antinomies are nonsense; (b) what Kant can and cannot mean when he claims that pure general logic is ‘formal’.

## Session Talks

**Joshua Anderson**

(Vienna Circle & Łukasiewicz, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*The Building Blocks of Scientific Knowledge: Neurath and Carnap on Protocol Sentences*

In this paper, I discuss the protocol sentence debate between Neurath and Carnap. Both maintain that philosophy should be focused on trying to advance scientific knowledge, and see protocol sentences as the building blocks of science. The paper will consist of three main parts. First, I will present Otto Neurath’s account of protocol sentences as explained in his essay, “Protocol Sentences.” The second portion of the paper will explain Rudolf Carnap’s account of protocol sentences as presented in his essay, “On Protocol Sentences.” The third portion of the paper will compare and contrast the two versions of protocol sentences.

**Peter Baumann**

(Anscombe 2, Saturday, 9am)

*Anscombe and the First Person*

As is well known, Elizabeth Anscombe denied that “I” refers to anything. This paper proposes a new reconstruction of the reasons one can find in her writings, especially in *The First Person*. I discuss three main reasons for her view that one can find in her writings: that there is a dilemma for the view that “I” refers, that “I” is not a proper name, and, mainly, that there is a reductio for referential views about “I”. A critical discussion of these reasons is followed by a description of implications and some more general problems a denial like Anscombe’s faces.

**Francesca Boccuni & Andrea Sereni**

(Varia 1, Thursday, 9am)

*The Conqueror’s Arrogance: Neo-logicism, Caesar Problem, and Frege’s Constraint*

Against structuralist accounts of arithmetic, neologicists argue that only a definition of natural numbers based on Hume’s Principle – unlike a structuralist stipulation of Peano Axioms – meets Frege’s Constraint (FC): this requires that a good definition of the concept of number encodes an explanation of its general

applicability. According to neologicists, FC is met only if the concept of number is a concept of individual objects. A threat for HP as a definition is the Caesar Problem (CP), and a solution to CP is needed for the concept of number to be a (pure) sortal concept. We will discuss the interdependency between the neologicist solution to CP and the claim that HP meets FC. We will suggest that the neologicist solution to CP makes HP an “arrogant”, and hence unsuitable, definition, according to neologicists' own distinctions. But if a proper solution to CP isn't offered, the ability of HP to meet FC is jeopardized, and so is its primacy over rival axiomatic definitions.

**Gregory Carroll**

(Wittgenstein 1, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*An Exact Notation for the Tractatus*

Central to the *Tractatus* is Wittgenstein's charge that the logical symbolism of Frege and Russell “still does not exclude all errors” (3.325). I investigate this charge by way of a simple language for use in a certain card game. I canvass two concrete errors that a Russellian formalization of this language fails to exclude, one familiar and one provocative. I show how these errors connect up with Wittgenstein's conception of sentences as pictures and with his charge that the old logic has tangled up formal and proper concepts. Finally, I introduce an alternative, Tractarian notation for the card game, and I moot the prospect of using this notation to express the general sentence-form and to do full-fledged constructive mathematics in line with the 5s and 6s.

**Agnese Casellato**

(Davidson and Quine, Saturday, 9am)

*Quine's Account of Observation Sentences vis-à-vis Davidson's Cartesian Reading*

Donald Davidson has argued that W.V. Quine's empiricism depends on sensory stimulations as epistemic intermediaries between theory and world (1974, 1990), a view which should be rejected. Once this step is taken, the doctrine that empirical or perceptual beliefs play a foundational epistemic role should also be abandoned. Nothing distinctive then, Davidson has suggested, is left to call empiricism. This paper addresses what Davidson describes as the ‘Cartesian’ spirit of Quine's account of observational beliefs (1990). I shall argue that Davidson's reading may not reflect what Quine's approach amounts to and that it may, perhaps, even conflict with it.

**Chen Bo**

(Jin Yuelin and Analytic Philosophy, Friday, 9am)

*Hume, Russell and JIN Yuelin on Causation: A Comparative Study*

In this talk, I will compare JIN's conception of causation with Hume's and Russell's, expound whether JIN's understanding of Hume's and Russell's positions is correct or not, and what he inherits from Hume and Russell, what his own theory of causation looks like. The main thesis of JIN's conception of causation are listed as follows: (i) presuppositions for causation: there are authentic perceptions, and there are external things; (ii) causation relata: events, not things; (iii) distinction of type causation (general causal relation) and token causation (realization of general causal relation in particular space and time); (iv) no gap or containing gap in space and time between cause and effect; (v) priority of cause and effect: empirical, theoretical or temporary priority; (vi) reliability of causation: about A—B (a general proposition for causal relation), JIN differentiates ‘necessity’ and ‘certainty’ of laws or principles, and asserts that ‘laws or principles have their intrinsic certainty’; about the realization of A—B in particular circumstance, he claims that ‘situations have no necessity of occurrence’.

**James Connelly**

(Russell 2, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Why Russell Abandoned his 1913 Theory of Knowledge Manuscript: The Logical Interpretation*

Following the completion of his work on *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13), Russell's plans and focus shifted to theory of knowledge and the epistemology of physical science. (*TK*, xiv) He had been invited by Harvard to teach logic and theory of knowledge in Spring 1914 and planned to write a book on theory of knowledge to serve as the basis of his course on that topic. (*TK*, xiv) While the first six chapters of *Theory of Knowledge (TK)* were eventually published as a series of articles in the *Monist* in 1914-15, it was never published in book form in Russell's lifetime. In this paper, I will argue that Wittgenstein's May-June critique of Russell's Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ) was the decisive factor in Russell's abandoning the *TK* manuscript. Secondly, Russell's progress was halted by other problems in the analysis of molecular propositional thought, which became evident as he was working through the analysis of atomic propositional thought in Part II of *TK*. Psychological factors played only a peripheral role, one driven by more fundamental logical problems, some highlighted by Wittgenstein and others discovered independently by Russell. I call the reading of Wittgenstein's critique and Russell's paralysis defended in this paper the Logical Interpretation (or LI). In developing and defending LI, I will thus try to explain both Wittgenstein's intentions with respect to the criticisms, along with their impact on Russell.

**Richard Creath**

(Carnap, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Carnap's Verificationism and Four Inadequate Arguments Against It*

Rudolf Carnap's "Overcoming Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language" made Carnap notorious. But it did not make him understood. In that paper Carnap developed a Verifiability Principle and used it to "overcome" metaphysics. The first part of the present paper examines the Verifiability Principle to illuminate its origins, nature, and consequences, especially for metaphysics. This part also explores the sources of some of the misunderstandings of that principle. This paper's second part examines four common objections raised against the Verifiability Principle and what defenses Carnap could use against these objections.

**Samuel Descarreaux**

(Varia 4, Saturday, 11am)

*Evidence and cause in nineteenth-century naturalized Kantianism: the analogical argumentative strategy of Helmholtz, Lange, and Quine?*

In this presentation, I argue that Helmholtz, Lange, and Quine share similar argumentative strategies despite their differences in philosophical and historical context. These strategies explain (i) how the naturalist self-referentiality shapes the definition of nervous stimulation of the sensory organs and (ii) how they recognize an epistemic (or evidential) function of this nervous stimulation, in addition to its causal function.

**Scott Dixon**

(Russell 2, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Russellian Positionalism*

There is a tension in the work of Bertrand Russell concerning his views about relations. In *Principles of Mathematics*, he endorses directionalism, according to which relations are directional, applying by

proceeding from one relatum to the other. But in *Theory of Knowledge* he adopts positionalism, the view that relations are directionless but have positions in them that their relata occupy. This incongruity has been interpreted as a *change* in Russell's views about relations. I argue that this interpretation cannot be maintained, since his positionalism can be *reduced to* his directionalism. The views can be construed as one and the same.

**Foad Dizadji-Bahmani**

(Wittgenstein 3, Saturday, 9am)

*Apprehension in Wittgenstein's Philosophy, A Non-Propositional Account*

*Understanding* is a key notion in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Throughout his writings, he rejects it as psychological. In the preface of TLP, Wittgenstein says that the "book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of our language." And the penultimate proposition makes recourse to the notion: "6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless..." There is a propositional explication of *understanding* in the 4s: to understand a proposition is to know its truth-conditions. This cannot be the notion underpinning that in 6.54, for senseless propositions lack such truth-conditions. So how should we understand *understanding* in 6.54? Short of viewing the TLP as trivially inconsistent, one infers that there must be a non-propositional notion of *understanding* implicit in TLP. I'll dub this non-propositional notion of *understanding*, '*apprehension*'. Whilst not cast in these terms, Conant, in "The Method of the *Tractatus*" examines the affinities between *apprehension* and Frege's notion of elucidation. In this paper, drawing on Conant's work and Wittgenstein's remarks in PI, I try to develop *apprehension*. Specifically, I consider the given analogies to understanding a musical theme and poetry (PI 527-533), and the difficulty of giving criteria for appropriate attributions of *apprehension*.

**Louis Doulas**

(Moore, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Moore's Fourth Condition*

While much ink has been spilled on the circularity of G.E. Moore's infamous proof, conspicuously absent from such discussions is an account of how Moore *himself* conceived of circularity. Indeed, it's widely assumed that Moore was largely oblivious to this circularity. Drawing on archival evidence and overlooked passages in Moore's posthumously published lectures, I provide, for the first time, such an account and show that Moore was deeply engaged with the problem of circular proof, anticipating and responding to such worries as early as 1927/28. What results is a new, deeper, and more contextually faithful reading of Moore's proof.

**Sean Dudley**

(Moore, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Moore and Kant on Judgment and Representing a Law*

The beginning of analytic philosophy can be traced to the publication of two articles by G.E. Moore in *Mind* in 1898 and 1899, entitled "Freedom" and "The Nature of Judgment," respectively. In these texts, drawn from his Cambridge Fellowship dissertation, Moore provides the arguments that successfully unseated idealism as the dominant philosophical school in Anglophone philosophy and laid the foundations for a realist account of propositions. This realist perspective was later developed by Russell

and others into a systematic theory of judgment, logic, and semantics that continues to influence contemporary work in these fields. In light of recent challenges to the descendants of Moore's realist account of judgment and a steady rise in the stock of idealism among analytic philosophers, this paper revisits Moore's confrontation with Kant and the latter's idealist doctrine that the act and the object of judgment, though materially distinct, are formally identical.

**Gary Ebbs**

(Quine & Logical Empiricism, Thursday, 11am)

*On Failing to Live Up to One's Own Methodological Standards*

This paper has two main goals. The first is to explain why the naturalistic explication of the inter-subjectivity of observation sentences that Quine proposed in §10 of *Word and Object* is unsuccessful by Quine's own standards. The second to use this example to suggest that Carnap's dismissal of Quine's criticisms of Carnap's explications of the analytic-synthetic distinction may have been partly due to Carnap's failure to apply his own standards correctly.

**Joshua Eisenthal**

(Wittgenstein 4, Saturday, 11am)

*Propositions as Pictures*

There is a very broad consensus that Wittgenstein's "picture theory" of representation, as it is presented in the *Tractatus*, applies primarily to Tractarian elementary propositions (names in immediate combination) and only derivatively to non-elementary propositions. However, despite this broad consensus there are a number of difficulties with such an interpretation. For example, whenever Wittgenstein states that propositions are pictures, he never suggests that this should be understood as applying primarily to elementary propositions. Thus my aim in this paper will be to sketch out an interpretation according to which the picture theory applies in the same way to *all* propositions.

**Landon Elkind**

(Data Science & History of Analytic Philosophy, Friday, 11am)

*Introducing the Principia Mathematica Map and Table Site*

In this talk I discuss the new Principia Mathematica Map and Table Site (PM-MATS). This new page includes maps of the entirety of *Principia Mathematica*. Besides this global map of *Principia*, the new site allows users to click on a given starred number to produce a standalone mini-map of the chapter in which it occurs. These mini-maps that show proof relationships (that is, citation relations within *Principia*'s demonstrations) between starred numbers.

The new table also includes a new online table that allows users to search every starred number of *Principia* (second edition included) and filter by chapter, page, part, and other properties that a starred number has. Users can export the results of these queries to JSON or CSV formats and, of course, do what they like with this now-manipulable data.

Besides demonstrating the uses of this new digital resource (feature requests are more than welcome in Q&A), I will argue that such resources for scholarship and editing of particularly dense philosophical texts by showing how such data reflects on our understanding (and especially scholarly (mis)impressions) of *Principia*. I will also argue that such resources are vital to connecting *Principia* and other path-clearing works to modern efforts to use computer theorem-provers build digital libraries of mathematical, logical, and philosophical knowledge.

**Mauro Engelmann**

(Wittgenstein 3, Saturday, 9am)

*Wittgenstein's Kierkegaard (The Tune of Silence)*

Wittgenstein scholars (Janik and Toulmin 1973; Conant 1995; Schönbaumfeld 2007), in spite of deep disagreement, have two common assumptions: that Wittgenstein knew a great deal of Kierkegaard when he was writing the *Tractatus* and that Kierkegaard's influence was determining in that book. After showing that those claims lack evidence, I argue that Wittgenstein's Kierkegaard at that time is the Kierkegaard that he saw in translations by Theodor Haecker and discussions that appeared in *Der Brenner* and *Die Fackel*. This Krausian Kierkegaard teaches us the kind of silence that Wittgenstein had in mind as the result of the *Tractatus*.

**Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla**

(Carnap, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Rudolf Carnap's Approach to the Problem of Induction*

Rudolf Carnap's examination of the inductive methodology of science challenges the idea that the justification of inductive methods is at odds with logical empiricism, as it relies on an allegedly synthetic a priori assumption of uniformity. Carnap offered a logical alternative to frequentist probability, advocating for a logical probabilistic approach to uniformity. By this, he aimed at salvaging logical empiricism. This talk examines the problem of deriving a relevant probabilistic statement about uniformity within Carnap's systems of inductive logic that can be cashed out also for justifying inductive methods.

**Greg Frost-Arnold**

(Carnap, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Carnapianism is an Existentialism*

My goal here is to describe a more detailed and nuanced case for Daniel Goldstick's core idea that Carnap (especially from 1934 *Logical Syntax of Language* on) shares a number of fundamental similarities with de Beauvoir, Camus, and Sartre, despite their many differences. For example, one of the more famous Existentialist slogans is 'Existence precedes essence.' This has a direct logical analogue in Carnap's Principle of Tolerance: According to Carnap, there's no fact of the matter about whether the law of excluded middle ('P or not-P') is provable or not, before I decide to use a classical language or an intuitionistic language. Stating this analogy explicitly:

Existence : essence :: My decision to use a classical (/intuitionistic) language : The (un)provability of the Law of Excluded Middle

As may be clear from this example, I am not asserting that Carnap is an Existentialist, or that Sartre is a Carnapian. Instead, my claim is that, if an Existentialist decided to apply basic Existentialist ideas to logic or theoretical rationality more generally, then (in many cases) Carnapian ideas would result. I will argue that Existentialist ideas about authenticity and freedom have clear analogues in Carnap's views.

**Mitchell Green**

(Wittgenstein 2, Friday, 9am)

*Searle's Wittgenstein*

Although Searle takes Wittgenstein to be the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century (Searle 2016, p. 527), he also sees the bulk of his own research as aimed at developing a critical response to Wittgenstein (Lash 2015, p. 138). Searle takes Wittgenstein's remark that there are innumerable ('unzählige') uses of

language, his view of meaning in terms of use, and his conception of language as game-like, as jointly entailing the impossibility of developing a systematic theory of language. Searle developed his theory of speech acts, as well as his supporting theory of Intentionality, in part to rebut that impossibility claim. This essay considers whether all three of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian themes threaten the project of theorizing about language in the way that Searle takes them to do. It also engages with recent work by defenders of Wittgenstein who either attack Searle's ambition to explain how mental phenomena can emerge in a physical world, or offer enactivism as an approach to explaining intelligent behavior in more parsimonious terms than those employed by Searle.

**Giuseppe Guastamacchia**

(Logical Empiricism, Friday, 11am)

*A Prehistory of Logical Empiricism: The Herbartian Heritage at Franz Exner's School*

Prominent contributions focusing on the origins of the Vienna Circle have shed light on the fundamental aspects of Austrian philosophy at the turn of the XIXth century, recognizing the substantial influence of Herbartianism. Nonetheless, it is only in recent years that a more comprehensive investigation has been undertaken, delving into Herbart's philosophical work and exploring the primary channels through which Herbartianism permeated Austrian philosophy. The primary goal of the paper is to examine the spread of the Herbartian methodology of "elaboration of concepts" in Bohemia during the late XIXth century, with a specific focus on the propagation of Herbartianism at the University of Prague, notably through the teachings of Franz Exner (1802–1853).

**Michael Hall**

(Existential Import, Thursday, 9am)

*Actuality and Existential Quantity: Extending Geach's Insight*

In response to 'thin' accounts of existence and their critics, this paper sketches an alternative account that remains quantificational but is not 'thin' by positing 'actual' as a first-order predicate, which circumvents a circularity objection and resolves the tensions out of which the objection arises. This alternative account extends Geach's insight to take Frege's distinction between sense of 'existence' as parallel to Aquinas' distinction between senses of *esse* by recasting the first sense of existence in Frege and Aquinas via the paradigm of act and potency to extend the first-order predicate of 'actual' to general existentials.

**Michael Hegarty**

(Varia 3, Friday, 3:45pm)

*Is Sellars's Early Theory of Perception Non-Doxastic?*

It is the orthodoxy in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind to sharply separate perceptual states and doxastic states like belief. And it is a natural thought that perceptual experiences serve as grounds for basic perceptual beliefs like 'This is green'. One way to make good on this thought is to claim that experiences are grounds for basic perceptual beliefs in the evidentialist sense of playing a justifying role. But a possible way to accommodate the same thought is to deny the orthodoxy, and take the view that perceptions are already doxastic states. The contemporary debate on perceptual epistemology may be traced back to the work of Wilfrid Sellars' so-called 'Dual-Component Intentionalism' — a view that distinguishes propositional and phenomenal components of experience. Given this influence, one might expect that there would be decisive agreement on whether Sellars' account of perception was doxastic or not. But this appears not to be the case. This paper reassesses Sellars' account of perception in his 'middle period', beginning with *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (1956) and ending in around 1972 (using a classification from Rosenberg (1990)). I argue that Sellars' view was in fact that perceptual states are

doxastic. I define a ‘doxastic state’ as one that has both content and assertoric force. I begin by looking at Anil Gupta’s interpretation of Sellars (2012), which defends a non-doxastic reading of his theory of perception. I analyse the textual evidence that Gupta offers and find that it offers no support for the non-doxastic reading. Then I discuss an interpretation offered by Michael Williams (2006) that perceptual experiences do have assertoric force for Sellars. I conclude that, despite some minor inconsistencies in Williams’ final assessment, this provides compelling reason to attribute a doxastic theory of perception to Sellars.

**Jeremy Heis**

(Russell 1, Friday, 9am)

*Russell and Kantianism, 1897–1900*

Russell famously criticized Kantianism in 1901, by arguing that Kantian philosophy was refuted by the new logic, which showed that intuition is not necessary for mathematical inferences. However, Russell himself had never claimed, during his “Kantian” period from 1897–1900, that mathematics requires pure intuition in order to underwrite inferences that logic is too weak to underwrite on its own. So what was Russell’s Kantianism really like? I trace Russell’s engagement with Kantian intuition during 1897–1900 to a conviction — which he gradually modified, deepened, and abandoned — that mathematics concerns homogeneous objects, such as magnitudes, that can only be represented using intuition.

**Jonas Held**

(Frege 1, Friday, 11am)

*Kant and Frege on Inference*

In Frege’s posthumously published fragment *Logic*, we find the following characterization of inferring: “To make a judgment because we are cognisant of other truths as providing a justification for it is known as inferring”. Rather than treating inference as a logical relation between propositional contents, Frege here explicitly speaks about the *activity of inferring*. It is the topic of my talk how this activity is best understood. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the activity of inferring is mostly understood in causal terms, where the acceptance of the premises is taken to be that which causes a thinker to accept the conclusion. It is then asked what further conditions must hold for such a causal relation between beliefs to count as inferring. Thus, starting with Frege’s characterization, Paul Boghossian has recently formulated the so-called taking condition: “Inferring necessarily involves the thinker *taking* his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion *because* of that fact.” With this condition, Boghossian tries to incorporate Frege’s insight that a thinker draws a conclusion based on his awareness of the premises as providing a justification for its truth. But as I will argue, as soon as we take inference to be a kind of causal relation between beliefs, we can no longer entitle ourselves to this insight. Thus, there is, as I see it, a significant difference between the way Frege conceives of the activity of inferring and the way contemporary thinkers do. Indeed, I believe Frege is right in describing inferring as the making of a judgment in the light of other truths, rather than as the activity of moving from the premises to the conclusion, as inferring is often described today. In my talk, I aim to offer a systematic account of the activity of inferring understood in this sense as a single act, a single judgment. The core idea is to identify the act of concluding with the act of logically combining the premises—an idea whose sources can be traced to Kant’s account of syllogistic reasoning. Finally, I will ask how this account relates to Frege’s own account of inferring.

**Michael Hicks**

(Logical Empiricism, Friday, 11am)

*Philosophy, Anti-Philosophy, and the Scientific Conception of the World*

Under the heading of the scientific conception of the world, members of the Vienna Circle like Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath are unified by a distinctive (non-Humean) ethics of discourse. This is consistent with the plurality of metaphilosophical views they held, including Neurath's anti-philosophy, Carnap's tolerant logicism, and Schlick's belief that they represented a revolutionary turning point. Most of my concern is in establishing this perspective. I conclude, though, by noting that metaphilosophical disagreements clearly informed first-order disagreements (e.g. in the protocol sentence debate), so if we want to take them seriously *as philosophers*, we need especially to reconsider Schlick's epistemology.

**David Hunter**

(Charles Travis Symposium, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Comments on Travis*

TBA

**Jim Hutchinson**

(Frege 1, Friday, 11am)

*A Defence of Critical Normativism*

I defend the Neo-Kantian “Critical Normativist” conception of philosophy—aspects of which are sometimes attributed to Frege—against two historically significant problems it is claimed (e.g., by Husserl) to have. Both are rooted in the fact that the normative claims on which philosophy is said to focus bear implication relations—even grounding relations—to non-normative claims which are said to be irrelevant to philosophy. The solution is that there is no conflict here: implication and grounding relations do not imply *methodological* relevance, which is all that matters to Critical Normativism. I also motivate a “self-refutation” argument for their methodological irrelevance.

**Peter Hylton**

(Carnap Tolerance, Thursday, 9am)

*The Background to Tolerance*

This essay aims to shed light on Carnap's reasons for adopting the Principle of Tolerance by emphasizing problems facing his earlier work. Before Tolerance, he rejects anything like traditional philosophy. He conceives of his own work as clarifying empirical statements by reducing them, by logical transformations, to the given. That raises two questions: one about the nature of the given and one about logic. Each of these questions threatens to become a philosophical question of the kind that Carnap rejects; the Principle of Tolerance gives Carnap a principled way of avoiding each question.

**Ryo Ito**

(Russell and Wittgenstein, Friday, 3:45pm)

*Russell and Wittgenstein on Fact and Complex*

In this paper, I argue that once we draw a distinction between two sorts of complex objects, we obtain a better account of Wittgenstein's distinction between fact and complex and of Russell's alleged difficulty in grasping this distinction. I do so by critically examining Michael Potter's careful exposition of these issues before presenting my own account.

**David Jakobsen**

(Prior and others, Thursday, 11am)

*Tense-Logic and Philosophical Theology*

This article examines Wolterstorff's (2009) explanation for why Philosophical Theology has flourished in analytic philosophy, by looking at Arthur Norman Prior's (1914–1969) development of tense-logic in light of his correspondence and analysis of quantified tense-logic and future contingency. These should lead us to modify Wolterstorff's emphasis on the importance of meta-epistemology for the resurgence of philosophical theology. Furthermore, given Prior's importance, we must modify the importance of theistic belief, assumed by Wolterstorff. This is not true for Prior who was motivated by the existential interest spurred by a skepticism that ultimately led him to reject his Christian beliefs.

**Nathan Kellen**

(Waismann, Thursday, 11am)

*Open-Texture Concepts and the Concept of Logical Consequence*

In this paper we examine Friedrich Waismann's influential account of open-texture concepts, and show how it can be used to give a conceptual analysis of the concept of logical consequence as an open-texture concept. We connect this with Tarski's influential analysis of logical consequence, and argue that the best way to make sense of Tarski's view is by interpreting logical consequence as an open-texture concept. We conclude by considering additional complications for this view, including whether it is compatible with Waismann's theory of analyticity.

**Teresa Kouri Kissel**

(Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*Stebbing's Four Traits of Common Sense and an Application*

Stebbing was an impressive philosopher, who expressed a particular view about common sense and its role in critical thinking and logic that has not yet been fully developed in the literature. I start by providing four traits Stebbing implicitly uses in her writing on common sense in order to characterize the notion for her. For Stebbing, common sense was public, needed no justification, and commonsense beliefs served as the basic data for both science and metaphysics. Most importantly for our purposes here, common sense was context-sensitive in a particular way. Whether a statement is a commonsense belief depends on the purpose to which we are directing our thinking in that context.

**Kevin Klement**

(Data Science & History of Analytic Philosophy, Friday, 11am)

*Open Source in Academic Philosophy: The Fregeifier, Open Typesetting, Logic, and Beyond*

Many academics have little knowledge of the many open source tools which could not only be useful for their work as is, but can be adapted, modified and combined to create even more powerful tools. Partly as a result of these, open access publishing has never been more feasible than it is today, and many of the barriers people imagine can be overcome. Besides these general themes, this talk will introduce a few of my open source projects, which could be used as case studies, including: (1) The Amazing Fregeifier, a set of tools for including complex and idiosyncratic mathematical and logical notation, such as Frege's Begriffsschrift notation, in documents of various kinds, (2) the Open Guide typesetting framework, already in use by the *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, allowing *JHAP* to distribute articles in additional and more accessible formats than was possible previously, (3) LogicPenguin, a framework for logic exercises with customizable deductive systems and notation, which integrates with LMSes such as Canvas and Moodle.

**Artur Kosecki**

(Varia 3, Friday, 3:45pm)

*John Laird's book Recent Philosophy and the Term "Analytic Philosophy" in 1930s Great Britain*

John Laird was a Scottish philosopher associated with New British Realism. He held the position of Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen from 1924 to 1946. Among his notable works during this time was *Recent Philosophy*, a book published in 1936 that provided a survey of current movements in philosophy. In this work, Laird included a chapter entitled "Analysis," which introduced the term "new analytic philosophy." Additionally, in the conclusion of the book, he used the term "contemporary analytical philosophy." My paper has two primary objectives. First, it seeks to describe Laird's contributions to philosophy. Second, it aims to elaborate on Laird's conception of "analytic philosophy" and compare it with the views of John Wisdom, L. S. Stebbing, A. J. Ayer, and Ernest Nagel.

**Michael Kremer**

(Ryle and Oxford, Friday, 3:45pm)

*What was Ryle's "concept of mind?"*

Gilbert Ryle's masterwork, *The Concept of Mind*, is often characterized as promoting a form of philosophical behaviorism which has been long superseded. I argue that Ryle's concept of mind is both more interesting, and more alien to contemporary ways of thinking, than this caricature reveals. Fundamentally, Ryle can be said to think of the mind in Aristotelian terms, as the form of the life of a rational animal. Ryle brings into the philosophy of mind a range of phenomena often left to moral philosophers, namely qualities of character; and he treats as peripheral other phenomena taken as central in contemporary philosophy of mind, such as conscious experience, sensation, imagination, and dreams. I lay out some of the distinctive features of Ryle's way of thinking about mindedness, and then investigate sources of his thinking: philosophical sources (Aristotle, Shaftesbury, Wittgenstein), literary sources (Austen), and sources in his practical experience (teaching in the Oxford tutorial system), arguing that these sources illuminate a distinctively Rylean concept of mind.

**Greg Lavers**

(Frege 2 Philosophy of Mathematics, Friday, 3:45pm)

*Frege's Three Definitions of Number in the Grundlagen*

There is a very standard reading of the three proposed definition of number offered in Frege's *Grundlagen* according to which the first is a false start, the second is on the right track, but still suffers from the Julius Caesar problem and the third is a necessary remedy to this problem. To a large extent, I take this to be based on what are now seen as standard reconstructions of these definitions into contemporary logical notation. I will look closely at the text of the three attempted definitions (in §55, §§62–63, and finally §68) and suggest a different syntax from how these definitions are standardly reconstructed. On my reading the definitions of §55 are not a false start, but suffer from exactly the three problems which Frege points out after presenting these definitions. The second definition, while it solves two of these problems, still suffers from the third (the JC problem), and the last solves this as well. This may seem like a minor correction, and in some sense it is, but it really affects the whole flow of the book from §46 to his to his final definition of §68. On the false start view, Frege is meandering through various definitions but is only satisfied once he arrives at his explicit definition of number. On my reading Frege is methodically moving from his fundamental thought to the form of definition he takes to be suggested by this and then refining it until he arrives at his final Definition.

**Jacob Lettje**

(Varia 2, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*Tarski's Theory of Truth and the Link Between Truth and Confirmation*

Tarski's theory of truth reached the German-language philosophical community in 1935, when the Vienna Circle and its interlocutors were divided over questions about truth, confirmation, and language. I argue that the uptake of Tarski's theory in this logical empiricist environment helped to create a clearer distinction between questions about truth, and questions about empirical confirmation. By showing that truth could be studied as a semantic matter that floats free of questions about empirical methodology, Tarski provided reason to think that questions about empirical confirmation and epistemology of science could be insulated from questions about the nature of truth.

**David Lindeman**

(Prior and others, Thursday, 11am)

*A Davidsonian Solution to Prior's Substitution Problem*

I present a unified view of the form and interpretation of indirect, direct, mixed, and attitude reports that results from combining Davidson's accounts of adverbial modification, indirect reports, and quotation. The view provides a solution to Prior's substitution problem while maintaining semantic innocence and respecting Davidson's view that semantic and inferentially relevant structure should correspond. Although arrived at by very different lines of consideration, this view has significant resonances with views recently elaborated by linguists. The solution to Prior's substitution problem aside, this result should be of independent interest. It should also be of interest to scholars of Davidson.

**Bernard Linsky**

(Vienna Circle & Łukasiewicz, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*Some Remarks on "The Principle of Contradiction and Symbolic Logic"*

When Jan Łukasiewicz wrote "The Principle of Contradiction and Symbolic Logic", the appendix to *On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle* in 1910, symbolic logic was new, and approached in two different styles. One style was used in the works in the algebraic tradition of Peirce and Schroeder. The other was Bertrand Russell's symbolic logic, not yet published in *Principia Mathematica*, but available in some earlier papers. This paper discusses the influence of these two traditions on Łukasiewicz's appendix and makes a suggestion about their later influence on logic in the Lwow-Warsaw School.

**Mathieu Marion**

(Ryle and Oxford, Friday, 3:45pm)

*Ryle as a "fidgety Cook Wilsonian" and Plato's Parmenides*

Beginning with biographical remarks, I shall argue that some of Cook Wilson's ideas entered, early on, into the particular alloy which characterizes Ryle's philosophy, hence his calling himself a "fidgety Cook Wilsonian" at that time. I shall then focus on a passage in Ryle's paper on Plato's Parmenides (1939) where he discusses the third man argument (Parm. 131e-134e) and show that he made use of an argument borrowed from Cook Wilson's on universals in *Statement and Inference* (1926) and, further, how the same point recurs (with a twist) in Ryle's brief discussion of universals in 'Systematically Misleading Expression' (1932).

**Soroush Marouzi & Mehdi Ebrahimpour**

(Ramsey, Thursday, 11am)

*When There Was Nothing to Discuss*

This paper offers a new historical explanation for the emergence of Frank Ramsey's concept of variable hypotheticals by contextualizing it within the social context of his time. Besides, it demonstrates how this historical analysis could contribute to the contemporary literature on the epistemology of disagreement by offering a new type of disagreement.

**Oliver Marshall**

(Philosophy of Logic & Mathematics, Friday, 9am)

*Alonzo Church's Early Formalism*

This talk is about Alonzo Church's early philosophy of mathematics and logic as formulated in "A Set of Postulates for the Foundations of Logic" (1932–33) and his subsequent "Richard's Paradox" (1934). These bear the influence of Russell and Hilbert, contain many ideas that would preoccupy Church throughout his career, and have implications for the theory of computation. There are also implications for Church's early views about the absoluteness of logic, which in turn explain his extreme reaction to Richard's paradox and Gödel's first theorem. These are "deplorable," "nihilistic," and imply "that the whole program of the mathematical logician is futile."

**Jacob McDowell**

(Charles Travis Symposium, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Charles Travis and Wittgenstein on Senses and Shadows*

Charles Travis has used the work of the later Wittgenstein to argue that semantics is always an occasion sensitive affair - that the meaning or sense an expression underdetermines what correctness conditions, if any, it possesses, and what contribution it makes to the correctness of wholes in which it figures. Much of the impetus for occasion sensitivity comes from Travis' reading of Wittgenstein's critique of the idea of 'shadows' — intermediaries between our expressions and the world that establish what each and every expression is a representation of, and which ensure correct understanding of any expression. Travis argues that Wittgenstein's criticisms of this idea leave us with an innocuous idea of senses or shadows which underdetermine the rest of an item's semantics and which admit of various understandings or interpretations. The upshot of Wittgenstein's criticism is not to restrict the powers of the 'shadows' that expressions bring to every one of their applications, but to reject the very picture of sense as an 'aura' or 'shadow' extractable from uses. In a slogan, senses are shadows cast by uses. Sense is not something fixed antecedently, which may then be put to different uses.

**Sofia Miguens**

(Anscombe 1, Thursday, 9am)

*Language and Action – On why the Affinity between Anscombe and Austin might be a False Lead*

Anscombe and Austin were central figures of mid-20<sup>th</sup> century Oxford philosophy; two recent biographies explore some of their interactions and disputes (McCumhaill and Wiseman 2022, Rowe 2023). Although the two of them were not on particularly friendly terms, one might expect that they converged methodologically, in their attention to ordinary language and to the work of words in worldly contexts. I will argue that this is a false lead, going through examples of how Anscombe's Aristotelian-Thomist

metaphysics of man was always behind her interest in action, whereas Austin's interest in excuses and in the many vulnerabilities of action shows a minimalist stance regarding the nature of philosophical investigations.

**Nikolay Milkov**

(Wittgenstein and others, Friday, 11am)

*Did Tolstoy Influence the Logical Philosophy of Wittgenstein's Tractatus?*

When discussing the theoretical similarities between Leo Tolstoy and Wittgenstein, the interpreters almost exclusively concentrate on Tolstoy's influence on the early Wittgenstein's view in ethics. Without any doubt, there are cases of such an influence. In this paper, however, we are going to explore Tolstoy's influence of the logic and the philosophy of language of the *Tractatus*.

**Mousa Mohammadian**

(Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism, Saturday, 9am)

*Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism in the US*

Charles Sanders Peirce is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist movement in the United States, Peirce's philosophy, especially his philosophy of science, received a warm reception from prominent representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of this movement. This reception was short-lived and Peirce gradually disappeared from the mainstream philosophy of science. Focusing on the interactions between early logical empiricism and Peirce's philosophy, this paper provides evidence for the initial warm reception, explains the following marginalization of Peirce, and brings to the foreground some of Peirce's valuable insights that were missed by the mainstream philosophy of science due to this marginalization.

**Matyáš Moravec**

(Varia 3, Friday, 3:45pm)

*Analytic Philosophy and Psychical Research 1940–1960: The Case of Casimir Lewy*

The aim of my paper is to argue against the predominant view that psychical research (i.e., the study of phenomena like telepathy, clairvoyance, ghosts, or communication with the spirits of the dead) ceased to be of interest to British philosophers after 1940. I will do so by discussing a network of analytic philosophers interested in psychical research and parapsychology between 1940 and 1960. I will also zoom in on a particular case of a key figure in the history of the analytic tradition, Casimir Lewy (1919–1991), who engaged with psychical science at the beginning of this period.

**Tyke Nunez**

(Russell 1, Friday, 9am)

*The Fall of Intuition: Space as a Collective Concept and Russell's 1897 Mind paper*

In his 1897 book, *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (EFG)*, Bertrand Russell takes what he calls 'forms of externality' to be sources of knowledge that serve as the foundation of mathematics—especially geometry. I argue that shortly after he publishes *Foundations*, in his July *Mind* essay, "On the Relations of Number and Quantity" (RNQ), Russell already seems to sour on forms of externality as legitimate sources of mathematical knowledge. In this essay I examine the argument of RNQ and locate the fundamental shifts in Russell's position.

**Luca Oliva**

(Quine & Logical Empiricism, Thursday, 11am)

*Logical-Empiricist Variations of the A Priori*

In light of Einstein's new physics and its non-Euclidean geometry (Bolyai and Lobachevsky, Riemann, Minkowski, among others), logical empiricists unanimously reject Kant's version of *a priori*, especially its psychological and apodictic features (Friedman 2007). However, its cognitive purpose is transformed but retained (Parrini 1998, 2002; De Boer 2010). Instances of logical-empiricist variations of the *a priori* are the notions of (a) *relativized a priori* and related *coordinative definitions* (Reichenbach 1920; Friedman 2001), (b) *implicit definitions* (Schlick 1918, Popper 1959; Einstein 1921; Giovannini-Schiemer 2019), and (c) *L-rules* (Carnap 1928). While (a) and (b), although differently (Friedman 1999), maintain the constitutive character of the *a priori*, (c) argues for its conventionality, following Poincaré (1902) and Hilbert (1899). Such *weak* and *strong* rejections of the Kantian *a priori* betray its uneasy evolution through logical empiricism, showing irreducible inconsistency.

**Irene Olivero**

(Semantics, Saturday, 11am)

*Kripke and Putnam on Semantic Externalism: Same Different Semantic Views*

Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975) are widely recognized as leading exponents in developing Semantic Externalism. They both attempt to prove that terms for natural kinds (such as 'water,' 'gold,' and 'tiger') are governed by externalist semantics, a conclusion they support using thought experiments that draw on the inference from conceivability to possibility. This paper reveals a fundamental divergence in their methodologies: Kripke endorses the transition from conceivability to possibility, whereas Putnam denies it. I will show how, despite their shared use of hypothetical scenarios, this impacts their semantic frameworks in crucial ways, making them significantly different – a difference that history of philosophy fails to acknowledge.

**Erica Onnis**

(Varia 4, Saturday, 11am)

*Emergent causal efficacy between British and Contemporary Emergentism*

In this paper, I argue that the authors who reintroduced the concept of emergence into the philosophical debate in the 1990s did so by attributing to the so-called British Emergentists contemporary metaphysical positions that the latter did not share. In a nutshell, British Emergentists were humean in relation with causation, while in the contemporary debate causation is understood in a non-humean, power-based framework. (Re)reading the emergentist debate in this contemporary key is not necessarily wrong, but it is important to recognise that doing so is not the only possible way to revive the emergentist worldview, nor is it a metaphysically neutral approach.

**Gary Ostertag**

(Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*E. E. Constance Jones on Proper Names and Acquaintance*

According to E. E. Constance Jones's "New Law of Thought", first stated in her *Elements of Logic as a Science of Propositions* (1890), "any subject of predication is an identity of denotation in diversity of intension." While some scholars take this to be a clear anticipation of Frege's distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, the truth is a bit more complicated. As I will show, Jones departs from Frege in two central ways: first, she emphatically *denies* that proper names have intension; in addition, she advocates what we might call an "acquaintance first" view, on which the capacity to refer to an entity presupposes

acquaintance with that entity. Thus, not only does her distinction fail to apply to the cases in which Frege was most interested, she rejects a defining characteristic of Fregean *Sinn* – that it determines reference.

**Eylem Özaltun**

(Anscombe 2, Saturday, 9am)

*The Author of Intention against Descartes*

Anscombe's "The First-Person" is ordinarily taken to be an elaboration of Wittgenstein's views on the first-person pronoun in *Blue Book* and later in *Investigations*. Hence very little attention is directed at the details of Anscombe's own text. In particular, the fact that the main opponent of her paper is Descartes is rarely mentioned. In this paper I focus on *how* Anscombe argues against Descartes. Anscombe ends her paper by marking an important difference between her and Descartes' investigations of "I": they consider different sets of I-thoughts. Anscombe considers I-thoughts relating to actions, postures, and movements, not the Cartesianly preferred thoughts such as "I am thinking about thinking", "I hope, envy, desire...", and so on. She says "My way is the opposite of Descartes". I claim that this opposite way is only available to the author of *Intention* and marks an important difference of Anscombe's treatment of the first-person thought from not only Descartes' but also Wittgenstein's.

**Walter Pedriali**

(Frege 2 Philosophy of Mathematics, Friday, 3:45pm)

*A Bridge Too Far? Basic Law V, Singular Thought, and Logicism*

As Burge (2000) noted, Basic Law V was supposed to provide the bridge between generality and particularity in Frege's logicism. I focus on one of the philosophical problems we would confront were we to adopt one of the many technical solutions to Russell's paradox. Unless we can show that the amended version of Basic Law V is not just true but logically true, Frege's epistemological purposes would still be frustrated. As many have noted (e.g. Beaney 1996, Heck & May 2010, Blanchette 2022), what Frege needs for those purposes is a notion of content more fine-grained than truth-values and less fine-grained than senses, so as to sustain the required claim that the two sides of Basic Law V have the same content. I explore the consequences of introducing into Frege's ontology proto-conceptual states of affairs that would straddle the realm of sense and the realm of reference without succumbing to Dummett's forceful objections to previous proposals.

**Allonzo Murriél Perez**

(Wittgenstein and others, Friday, 11am)

*Ethical life and forms of life: Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hegel*

This paper is an attempt in investigating the concept of forms of life (*Lebensformen*) starting from Hegel's employment of the term in the *Science of Logic*. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein in *The Brown Book*, asserts that to imagine a language is to imagine a culture, but in the *Philosophical Investigations*, it is to imagine a form of life (*Lebensform*). What then is the importance of this replacement? Following Cavell's direction—in which the multiple definitions of Wittgenstein's forms of life are suggested to contain both a biological and an ethological character—this paper unfolds all the dimensions of this approach of life as a form, including the articulation of the biological and the ethological it engages with.

**Patrice Philie**

(Wittgenstein 1, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*The Tractatus and Philosophical Practice: A comparison with Plato's Sophist*

The conception of philosophy in the *Tractatus* under the “standard” and the “resolute” readings is, in both cases, problematic. Proponents of the standard reading must account for the *content* of the views that Wittgenstein is putting forward. The resolute reading seems to commit its proponents to the view that Wittgenstein is the gravedigger of philosophy. In this presentation, I will compare one of Plato's late dialogue, the *Sophist*, with the *Tractatus* and show how this reveals the “first” Wittgenstein to be, after all, quite a traditional philosopher.

**Jimmy Plourde**

(Wittgenstein 1, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*Wittgenstein and the Fate of the Identity Theory of Truth*

In Wittgenstein's ‘Notes on Logic’, Michael Potter (2011) claims that Wittgenstein's picture theory was aiming to be an identity theory of truth. His view is partly based on his conjecture that this was the result of the influence of Frege's critique of the correspondence theory upon Wittgenstein. Such a view has also been held by Sullivan and Johnston (2018), though on a different basis. This not only contradicts however the standard reading of the *Tractatus* according to which Wittgenstein holds a correspondence theory of truth, but also challenges the view that the fate of the identity theory within the Early Analytic Tradition was its rejection by Moore and Russell around 1910 mainly because of the theory's inability to cope with the problem of objective falsehoods. Though sympathetic to the identity theory reading of the *Tractatus*, I argue in the present paper that it is ill-founded. I then draw attention to remarks of the *Tractatus* and the pre-*Tractatus* writings which suggest an alternative outcome: though Wittgenstein agreed with Moore and Russell that the identity theory is to be rejected, he adopted a view of correspondence that is based on identity, and which can uphold a central element of Frege's critique of the correspondence theory.

**Consuelo Preti**

(Moore, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Moore's Debate with Idealism Before and After 1899*

Traditional accounts of the history of early analytic philosophy routinely assert that analytic philosophy emerged from G. E. Moore's rejection of F.H. Bradley's Absolute Idealism, invariably described as the dominant view in late 19<sup>th</sup> century British philosophy. The fracture appeared in Moore's “The Nature of Judgment” (NJ). But, significantly, most of NJ was devoted to a criticism of Kant. Moore's engagement with Kant—specifically, with what he thought of as Kant's idealism—is an underemphasized element of Moore's debate with idealism, especially at the inflection point of his early work. I will show how Moore's initial debate with idealism was rooted in his defense of what he called the metaphysical basis of ethics. In this way, we can fill in some unexplored details of Moore's engagement with Idealism before and after 1899.

**Luca Alberto Rappuoli**

(Russell 2, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Russell, Pragmatism, and Analysis*

In two famous essays (1908, 1909), Russell examines the doctrines of Pragmatist philosophy. Notoriously, his assessment is mixed: on the one hand, he claims that the pragmatist methodology is largely agreeable. On the other, he argues that the pragmatist theory of truth is flawed. This contribution seeks to establish whether Russell can coherently embrace the pragmatist methodology without also embracing its

associated conception of truth. Our answer is a sceptical one, as we will observe that Russell's conception of analysis around 1908–1909 makes it unclear whether his critique of the pragmatist theory of truth can achieve the desired result.

**Michael Rieppel**

(Russell and Wittgenstein, Friday, 3:45pm)

*Russell's Proof and Meaning in Isolation*

In Chapter III of *Principia Mathematica*, Russell gave a proof (repeated in several later writings) to show that definite descriptions are “incomplete symbols” that have “no meaning in isolation.” Despite the importance Russell seems to attach to it, many commentators have regarded it as obviously fallacious. Perkins has offered an interpretation that aims to rehabilitate the proof, but does not, I suggest, vindicate the conclusion about meaning in isolation in a sufficiently robust sense. This paper aims to close that gap by offering an alternative interpretation according to which the proof relies on Russellian ideas about propositional structure. It concludes by revisiting the oft-discussed question of whether Russell could have accepted a generalized-quantifier treatment of definite descriptions on which they have second-order properties as their meanings.

**João Carlos Salles Pires da Silva**

(Varia 2, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*The Criticism of Esperanto: An Aspect of Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution*

Carnap recognizes a profound divergence in analytical philosophy “in the question of natural versus constructed languages.” An example would be the contrasting positions on Esperanto, where Carnap's enthusiasm opposes Wittgenstein's repulsion. More than a specific question, perhaps motivated by idiosyncratic inclinations, this is a significant aspect that can illuminate essential aspects of Wittgenstein's work. We then intend to show how his reaction to Esperanto, motivated by a strong culturalist vision of the language, favors the deepening of a true Copernican revolution, through which we see the founding of a perspectivism without relativism.

**Julian Schlöder**

(Frege 2 Philosophy of Mathematics, Friday, 3:45pm)

*Basic Rules of Arithmetic*

Inferential expressivism makes a systematic distinction between inferences that are valid *qua* preserving commitment and inferences that are valid *qua* preserving evidence. I argue that the characteristic inferences licensed by the principle of comprehension, from  $x$  is  $P$  to  $x$  is in the extension of  $P$  and *vice versa*, fail to preserve evidence, but do preserve commitment. Taking this observation into account allows one to phrase inference rules for unrestricted comprehension without running into Russell's paradox. In the resulting logic, one can derive full second-order arithmetic. Thus, it is possible to derive classical arithmetic in a consistent logic with unrestricted comprehension.

**Stewart Shapiro**

(Waismann, Thursday, 11am)

*Semantic Indeterminacy, Concept Sharpening, Set Theories*

Friedrich Waismann once suggested that mathematical concepts are not subject to open-texture; they are “closed”. In other work, I have highlighted some traditional mathematical notions that were, at least at one time, open-textured. One of them is the notion of “polyhedron” following the history sketched in Lakatos's *Proofs and Refutations*. Another case is computability, which has now been sharpened into a

plausibly closed notion, via the Church-Turing thesis. There are also some mathematical notions that have longstanding, intuitive principles underlying them, principles that later proved to be inconsistent with each other, sometimes when the notion is applied to cases not considered previously (in which case it is perhaps an instance of open-texture). One example is “same size”, which is or was governed by the part whole principle (one of Euclid’s Common Notions) and the one-one principle, now called “Hume’s Principle”. Another is the notion of continuity.

The purpose of this talk is to explore the notion of “set” and other related (perhaps once identical) notions like class, totality, and the like. We tentatively put forward a thesis that this notion, too, is or was subject to open-texture (or something like it) and could be (and has been) sharpened in various ways. This raises some questions concerning what the purposes of a (sharpened) theory of sets are to be. And, in that context, the role of trying to give non-ad-hoc explanations or answers to various questions.

**James Shaw**

(Semantics, Saturday, 11am)

*Semantic Transparency in the Analytic Tradition*

Semantic Transparency is the thesis that if you fully know the meanings of two linguistic expressions, you’re in a position to know whether or not they mean the same. I very briefly review the case that this principle represents a rare and striking point of agreement between Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein. Indeed, Transparency remained a bedrock principle of semantic epistemology for decades, only starting to fall out of favor in the early 1980s. Curiously, direct arguments against Transparency are few, weak, and tend to postdate the historical reversal. (If time permits, I will consider one such later argument from Williamson (2000) based on anti-luminosity considerations.) So why did the shift occur? I suggest that Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* made an influential, surreptitious presupposition incompatible with Semantic Transparency. As the tradition shifted to accommodate that presupposition, Transparency silently went by the wayside.

**Peter Slezak**

(Davidson and Quine, Saturday, 9am)

*Meaning: Explanation or Interpretation?*

The dominance of the Davidson-Quine approach to semantics among Analytic philosophers must be confronted with the fact that it appears to be incompatible with the explanatory scientific approach of Chomsky’s generative linguistics. The tension may be seen where Davidson (1999, 252) asserts the irrelevance, if not inconsistency, of his enterprise with scientific inquiry. The contrasting senses of understanding and intelligibility are central to the issues at stake. For philosophers in the Analytic tradition, it is perhaps surprising to discover that the doctrines of Davidson and Quine are the defining themes of hermeneutical Continental philosophy.

**Andrew Smith**

(Carnap Tolerance, Thursday, 9am)

*Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance as a Pragmatic Maxim for Cooperation*

I offer a version of Carnap’s principle of tolerance that can be defended using Carnap’s motivations for the principle and which does not presuppose his analytic-synthetic distinction. It applies in circumstances with cooperating inquirers who seek to avoid persistent disagreement. Roughly, it says that, if inquirers’ both believing in the truth of a set of sentences enables them to avoid persistent disagreement in their joint inquiry, it is rational to believe in the truth of that set. I argue my version of tolerance is acceptable to Quineans and provides a notion of conventional truth without the analytic-synthetic.

**Fredrik Stjernberg**

(Ramsey, Thursday, 11am)

*Ramsey's Constructivist Turn*

My talk is about the constructivist turn in Ramsey. In a few years, Ramsey moves from trying to refine and develop Russell's logicism (1926), to becoming more positive towards the "Bolshevik menace" of intuitionism. In 1926, appeals to the law of excluded middle or talk about infinite totalities were held to be unproblematic, but in 1929, the general outlook has changed considerably. I trace the steps and the ways in which this reorientation had effects on other aspects of his thought. Connections with the work of Hermann Weyl are discussed.

**Marta Sznajder**

(Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum's Early Works: Between Warsaw and Cambridge*

This paper investigates the extent of the influence that Frank Ramsey's work had on Janina Hosiasson's theory of inductive reasoning and what Hosiasson's theory was (or could have been, given the complicated nature of the available sources) before she came into personal contact with Cambridge philosophers. Hosiasson turns out to be a proponent of a particularly minimal theory of epistemic probability.

**Yi Shee Gerald Teng**

(Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism, Saturday, 9am)

*Pap and Lewis on Theoretical Change*

Recent work has shown Arthur Pap to be closely aligned with American pragmatism. It is, however, controversial whether Pap's pragmatism is anything more than a restatement of C. I. Lewis's. This essay will argue that Pap's brand of pragmatism, as developed in *the A Priori in Physical Theory*, is an account of theoretical *progress*. I then show that this is an advancement over Lewis's pragmatism, which primarily concerns theoretical change. My goal is twofold: to highlight Pap's original contributions to the pragmatist tradition, and to thereby put us in a position to assess the contemporary relevance of Pap's insights.

**Valérie Lynn Therrien**

(Philosophy of Logic & Mathematics, Friday, 9am)

*On Counting as Mathematical Progress: Kuratowski-Zorn's Lemma and the Path Not Taken*

In her *Naturalism in Mathematics*, Maddy claims that historical case studies give us sufficient reason to exclude extra-mathematical considerations from our account of mathematical progress. Indeed, she vouches that historical case studies can be tested against the predictions of a reconstructed means-end analysis. We have carefully chosen a case study: the case of the Kuratowski-Zorn Lemma. Can Maddy's framework account for why Zorn's Lemma counts as mathematical progress, but Kuratowski's prior equivalent maximal and minimal principle does not?

**Natalia Tomash**

(Vienna Circle & Łukasiewicz, Thursday, 3:45pm)

*Was Moritz Schlick Anti-Metaphysicist?*

This paper discusses ideas of Moritz Schlick – the founder of the Vienna Circle. Author argues that despite the prominent text of the Manifesto, Schlick's philosophical ideas were not entirely anti-metaphysical. Early Schlick was influenced by Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Kant and was working all his life on ethical issues.

**Jasmin Trächtler**

(Wittgenstein 4, Saturday, 11am)

*Wittgenstein and Feminist Conceptual Engineering — of Idling and Hot Running Wheels*

Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophy seems to be irreconcilably opposed to the endeavours of ameliorative projects in conceptual engineering. In this talk, I will critically examine the relationship between Wittgenstein's descriptive philosophy and some ameliorative projects in conceptual engineering from a Wittgensteinian and feminist perspective. I will first discuss some aspects of Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy before taking a closer look at the aspirations behind some approaches to feminist conceptual engineering. I will conclude with a critical résumé on the role of philosophy in conceptual change.

**Charles Travis**

(Charles Travis Symposium, Saturday, 3:45pm)

*Putting Crystalline Purity in its Place*

In 1929 Wittgenstein watched the *Tractatus* collapse before his eyes. Telegraphically put, it posited simples which (he came to see) there could not be. My brief here is that the first part of *Philosophical Investigations*—up to, say, §136—is tasked, not with resuscitating the patient, but rather with diagnosing the problem, and then answering better the question which the *Tractatus*, following Russell, answered wrongly: the question how non-factive representing can relate to particular items so that it is precisely *these* on which truth is thus made to turn. Here it is Russell found staring up from the bottom of the emptied beer mug.

**Renato Turco**

(Varia 1, Thursday, 9am)

*Slurs under Discussion: An Attempt to Systematize Colouring*

Frege's observations on colouring have recently gained a renewed interest in the philosophical literature, thanks to the development of the studies on *expressives* and *slurs*. Whether the content of a derogatory expression like "Renato is a hike" belongs to the truth-conditional meaning of the expression, or to the pragmatic interface as conventional implicature or presupposition, is a topic highly discussed. In my work, I propose to analyze slurs within the Question Under Discussion linguistic account, in that it may encompass both the linguistic and the psychosocial issues of derogatory statements.

**Timur Uçan**

(Anscombe 1, Thursday, 9am)

*Not Something and not Nothing: Anscombe, Sartre and Wittgenstein on the Intelligibility of Action*

With this article, I propose to study deep convergences of the philosophies of Anscombe, Sartre and Wittgenstein with respect to the philosophical problem of the intelligibility of action. I propose to render

clear that for the three philosophers, debates between causalist and metaphysicalist conceptions of actions can be satisfactorily addressed by means of clarifications of our concept of action.

**Simon Wimmer**

(Ryle and Oxford, Friday, 3:45pm)

*Oxford Realists on the Objects of Thought*

Following Cook Wilson, later figures such as the early Ryle, Kneale and Richard Robinson treat knowledge as basic, rather than as a kind of thinking. Consequently, they can insist that knowledge has an object—the reality or fact known—but forms of thinking other than knowledge do not. I explain how this allows them to avoid worries regarding the nature of the objects of thought widespread at their time, whilst still accommodating the motivations for such objects. Comparing their accounts, I argue that, despite his marginal status in the history of analytic philosophy, Richard Robinson's is the most promising.

**Beyong-uk Yi**

(Existential Import, Thursday, 9am)

*Venn & Existential Import: Development of the Modern Doctrine of Categorical Propositions*

Modern logic departs from traditional logic in its treatment of existential import of categorical propositions. Traditional logic incorporates the traditional doctrine of categoricals, on which universal affirmatives have existential import: 'Every chimera is white', for example, implies 'Some chimera is white' and 'There is a chimera.' Modern logic departs from traditional logic by rejecting the subalternation rule and holds that universal propositions do not have existential import while particular propositions do. But Boole (1847; 1854) and De Morgan (1847), who pioneered modern studies of logic, accepted the traditional doctrine of categoricals. This article examines the later development of the modern doctrine with focus on John Venn, who introduced the very notion of "existential import" to argue that the modern doctrine is superior to the traditional doctrine. The article will examine his discussion of subalternation and existential import and his reason for espousing the modern doctrine. It will also compare his views on existential import with those of his contemporaries, including Boole and De Morgan.

**David Zapero**

(Wittgenstein 2, Friday, 9am)

*Wittgenstein's Treatment of Aspect-Seeing in the Investigations*

TBA

**Zhu Jing**

(Jin Yuelin and Analytic Philosophy, Friday, 9am)

*Jin Yuelin's Epistemology*

Jin Yuelin (金岳霖 1895-1984) was among the most influential of the first generation of analytic philosophers in China. Whereas he was a highly respected scholar who had introduced modern logic to China and a successful teacher who had trained a group of distinguished Chinese logicians and philosophers, his own original contributions to analytic philosophy are not well-recognized, assessed or appreciated, especially in light of the history of analytic philosophy worldwide.

*Epistemology* is Jin's most important work. He wrote a first draft during World War II (1937-45), but this was lost in an air raid. Jin had to rewrite the whole book, but the Communist Party prevented its

publication in 1948, so it was not published until nearly 40 years later in 1983, one year before his death. Viewed in hindsight, this work ranks as one of the best of the time, when analytic epistemology was in its incubation stage before becoming one of the major branches in contemporary analytic philosophy. Jin's *Epistemology* is extraordinarily rich in philosophical insights and novelties, including a full-fledged disjunctive theory of perception, twenty years earlier than J. M. Hinton, often regarded as the pioneer of disjunctivism.

The intricate and lamentable fate of *Epistemology* reflects the bumpy journey of analytic philosophy in China in the 20th century, and respectful and thoughtful studies of this masterwork may provide inspirations and lessons to better develop analytic philosophy in China in the 21st century.