Volume 8.5 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access.
It features an article by Ali Hossein Khani entitled, “Davidson’s Wittgenstein”. Here is an abstract:
Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential figures in Davidson’s later works on meaning, it is not, for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic ideas about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the way this requirement must be met. These ideas, however, are interpreted by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson even attempts to respect Wittgenstein’s quietism, provided that we understand this view in the way Davidson does. Having argued for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at least, his more theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects, such as that of constructing a formal theory of meaning and his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this Wittgensteinian quietist view.
JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!
Volume 7.2 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open access.
This volume is a special issue: Donald Davidson: Looking back, Looking forward, edited by Claudine Verheggen. The volume contains five substantial articles, as well as an introductory essay. Here is an abstract:
The papers collected in this issue were solicited to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of Donald Davidson’s birth. Four of them discuss the implications of Davidson’s views—in particular, his later views on triangulation—for questions that are still very much at the centre of current debates. These are, first, the question whether Saul Kripke’s doubts about meaning and rule-following can be answered without making concessions to the sceptic or to the quietist; second, the question whether a way can be found to answer Davidson’s own doubts about the continuity of non-propositional thought and language; third, the question whether normative properties can be at once causal and prescriptive; fourth, the question whether folk psychological explanations can be at once illuminating and autonomous. The fifth paper reexamines Davidson’s take on the principle of compositionality, which always was at the centre of his theorizing about language.
Table of contents
- Claudine Verheggen: Volume Introduction
- Olivia Sultanescu and Claudine Verheggen: Davidson’s Answer to Kripke’s Sceptic
- Dorit Bar-On: Crude Meaning, Brute Thought (or: What Are They Thinking?!)
- Robert Myers: Davidson’s Meta-Normative Naturalism
- Karsten R. Stueber: Davidson, Reasons, and Causes: A Plea for a Little Bit More Empathy
- Peter Pagin: Compositionality in Davidson’s Early Work
JHAP is a free, open-access peer reviewed journal. It is available at jhaponline.org. Submissions welcome!