Logic, Truth, Objecthood: A Celebration of Tom Ricketts’s Work in the History of Analytic Philosophy

News,

On 16th September 2022, an in-person conference will be held at the University of Pittsburgh to celebrate the work of Professor Thomas Ricketts on the occasion of his retirement. Speakers will include:

Gary Ebbs (Indiana University)
Juliet Floyd (Boston University)
Peter Hylton (Boston University)
Jeremy Heis (UC Irvine)
Michael Kremer (University of Chicago)
Tyke Nunez (University of South Carolina)

The conference will be co-organized by Tyke Nunez (an16@mailbox.sc.edu), James Pearson (j1pearson@bridgew.edu), and James Shaw (jrs164@pitt.edu). More details can be found at the conference website: https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/tom-ricketts

All are welcome to attend.

Susan Stebbing’s Intellectualism

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Volume 10.4 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access:

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/472

It features an article by Bryan Pickel, entitled “Susan Stebbing’s Intellectualism.” Here is the abstract:

This paper reconstructs Susan Stebbing’s account of intelligent dealing with a problem and defends this account against charges that it relies on a “censurable kind” of intellectualism. This charge was made in Stebbing’s own time by Laird and Wittgenstein. Michael Kremer has recently made the case that Stebbing is also a proximate target of Gilbert Ryle’s attack on intellectualism. This paper argues that Stebbing should indeed be counted as an intellectualist since she holds that intelligent dealing with a problem requires propositional thought. Yet, for Stebbing, thinking is an activity of a whole person and is enabled and constrained by their dispositions. This complex picture of a thinker enables Stebbing’s account to resist arguments targeting certain forms of intellectualism such as Ryle’s regress argument. It also helps her to respond to the charge that she overemphasizes the importance of intellectual failures. On the picture that emerges, Stebbing offers a strikingly modern epistemology that incorporates the social features of a person as well as their purely intellectual features.

JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!

Wittgenstein’s Reductio / Review of work on Necessity

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Volume 10.3 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access:

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/471

It features an article by Gilad Nir, entitled “Wittgenstein’s Reductio.” Here is the abstract:

By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. I further show that the argument seeks to undermine core commitments of Frege’s and Russell’s. But the reductio, as I read it, is not intended to establish the falsity of any of their specific assumptions. Rather, its aim is to make manifest the indeterminacies that underlie the language in which these assumptions are framed, and establish the need for a transformation of that language. So understood, Wittgenstein’s argument exemplifies his idea that philosophy is not a theory, but an activity of elucidation. The interpretation I propose bears on one of the central debates in the literature, namely how we should understand Wittgenstein’s contention that his elucidations succeed despite being nonsensical.

The volume also contains a review of Sanford Shieh, Necessity Lost (Oxford University Press, 2019), written by Roberta Ballarin.

JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!

Analysis, Decomposition, and Unity in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus / Review of work on Race and Gender

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Volume 10.2 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access:

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/469

It features an article by Oliver Thomas Spinney, entitled, “Analysis, Decomposition, and Unity in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.” Here is the abstract:

I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect to propositional unity.

The volume also contains a review of Matt LaVine, Race, Gender, and the History of Early Analytic Philosophy (Lexington, 2020), written by James Pearson.

JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!

Mackie and the Meaning of Moral Terms / Review of work on Frege

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Volume 10.1 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access:

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/464

It features an article by Tammo Lossau, entitled, “Mackie and the Meaning of Moral Terms.” Here is the abstract:

Moral error theory is comprised of two parts: a denial of the existence of objective values, and a claim about the ways in which we attempt to make reference to such objective values. John Mackie is sometimes presented as endorsing the view that we necessarily presuppose such objective values in our moral language and thought. In a series of recent papers, though, Victor Moberger (2017), Selim Berker (2019), and Michael Ridge (2020) point out that Mackie does not seem to commit himself to this view. They argue that Mackie thinks this reference to objective values can, and perhaps should, be detached from our moral statements and judgments. In this paper, I argue that Moberger, Berker, and Ridge are right to point out that Mackie stops short of claiming a necessary connection between moral language and a commitment to objective values, but that he does not endorse the contrary claim either. Instead, Mackie stays neutral on the question whether it is possible to assert moral statements or make moral judgments without presupposing objective value. This is because he does not need to take a position on this matter. Mackie only engages with the conceptual analysis of moral language and thought to the extent required to achieve his argumentative goals: he wants to reject revisionary analyses of moral language and to refute the idea that we can assume moral truths to be in alignment with ordinary moral language.

The volume also contains a review of Joan Weiner, Taking Frege at his Word (OUP, 2021), written by Hans Sluga.

JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!

Frege in Philosophical-Historical Context

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Volume 9.11 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access:

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/461

This special issue was edited by Juliet Floyd and Sanford Shieh and consists of the following papers, as well as an introduction.

“Frege, Hankel, and Formalism in the Foundations” by Richard Lawrence: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5007

“Frege’s Curiously Two-Dimensional Concept-Script” by Landon D. C. Elkind: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5008

“Logical Concepts vs. Logical Operations: Two Traditions of Logic Re-revisited” by Tabea Rohr: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5010

“The Fate of the Act of Synthesis: Kant, Frege, and Husserl on the Role of Subjectivity in Presentation and Judgment” by Jacob Rump: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5030

“Frege on the Fruitfulness of Definitions” by Rachel Boddy: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5031

“Strictures on an Exhibition: Frege on his Primitive Laws” by Alexander Yates: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5033

JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!

SSHAP 2022 (Shanxi): Call for Abstracts/Papers

Annual Meetings, Meetings, News

The tenth annual conference of the Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy (SSHAP) will be held at School of Philosophy, Shanxi University 山西大学, 6-8 July, 2022.  The format will be a hybrid of online and in-person participation. In-person sessions will be held at the Academic Hall of School of Philosophy, Shanxi University; the online sessions will be on zoom.

It is locally organized by Professor Jiang Yi 江怡教授, with the assistance of Professor Chen Changshen 陈敬坤, Professor Chen Jingkun 陈常燊, Dr. Gu Chengcheng 谷城成, and Dr. Fu Xingyuan 傅星源. The main local sponsors and supporters are the School of Philosophy and Sociology of Shanxi University 山西大学哲学社会学学院, and the Chinese Society for Analytic Philosophy 中国分析哲学专业委员会.

The conference website will be online in early 2022.

Invited Speakers:

SSHAP – Call for Papers/Abstracts

SSHAP is an international organization aimed at promoting discussion in all areas of scholarship concerning the development of philosophical logic, philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ethics and metaethics, the philosophy of science, and epistemology. We welcome scholars interested in the many ways in which the disciplines were influenced by thinkers such as Bolzano, Brentano and his school, Husserl, Frege, Russell, the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein, Tarski, Quine and the Polish school, for instance, but also seek to promote work engaging with lesser known figures and trends, as well as connections of analytic philosophy with other traditions and practices in philosophy all over the world.  We would like to invite submissions for our 2022 annual conference. Papers on all aspect of the analytic historical tradition of philosophy are welcome.

Given the development of analytic philosophy in China and Asia, more generally, we are especially interested in papers exploring this development as well as the use of analytic methods and ideas in understanding Asian philosophies, and comparative investigations of Asian and analytic philosophy.

The principal conference language is English. Presentations in other languages are welcome. In particular, we welcome presentations in Chinese, the language of the local organizing institution.  Please note, however, that, given the present nature of international scholarly exchange, one might limit the accessibility of one’s research by not presenting in English or Chinese.

SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 1, 2022.

In the past, some of the papers presented at the annual conference were published in the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy.

Submission Instructions

Authors are requested to submit a long abstract, whether or not they submit a paper as well. The abstract will be the main basis for our decisions. Please submit according to the following guidelines:

  1. Long abstracts (500-1000 words) should be prepared for blind refereeing,
  2. put into PDF file format, and
  3. sent as an email attachment to sshap2022@163.com.
  4. The subject line of the submission email should include the key-phrase “SSHAP submission”, and
  5. the body text of the email message should constitute a cover page for the submission by including a) return email address, b) author’s name, c) affiliation, d) paper title, and e) short abstract (50-100 words) and f) academic rank.

Authors will be informed of decisions on their submissions by 1 April, 2022.

Time allowed for presentation is 45 minutes (including discussion).

Carnap and Quine on Sense and Nonsense

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Volume 9.10 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access:

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/456

It features an article by James Andrew Smith, entitled, “Carnap and Quine on Sense and Nonsense.” Here is the abstract:

I offer an interpretation of Carnap and Quine’s views on cognitive significance and insignificance. The basic idea behind their views is as follows: to judge an expression is insignificant is to recommend it not be used in or explicated into languages used to express truth-valued judgments in inquiry; to judge an expression is significant is to recommend it be used in or explicated into such languages. These judgments are pragmatic judgments, made in light of purposes for language use in inquiry. For Carnap at least, these pragmatic judgments are non-cognitive. This basic idea is only a roughly correct statement of their views. This is because the details of the scientific languages they recommend for inquiry are necessary to understand their views and the way they understand their own views. Even so, I offer two reasons to suggest that this basic idea is worthy of our consideration today. First, it provides a conception of significance that captures the natural thought that epistemological concerns can lead us to consider expressions to be insignificant without requiring an objectionable form of verificationism. Second, if we appeal also to Carnap and Quine’s pluralistic attitude toward explication, we can make a pragmatic judgment that an expression is insignificant while judging it to be significant on a distinct explication of significance fit for describing and explaining natural language.

JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!

Recovering the History of Analytic Philosophy with Stanley Cavell

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Volume 9.9 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access:

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/451

This special issue was edited by Edward Guetti and G. Anthony Bruno and consists of the following seven papers, as well as an introduction by Edward Guetti.

“Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo” by Duncan Pritchard: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4914

“Schelling, Cavell, and the Truth of Skepticism” by G. Anthony Bruno: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4919

“Stanley Cavell on What We Say” by Arata Hamawaki: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4915

“Cavell and the ‘History of the Rejection of the Human'” by Edward Guetti: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4913

“Cavell’s Method: Pursuing and Subverting the Analytic Tradition” by Sandra Laugier: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4916

“Cavell and the Quest for a Voice: The Importance of the Notion “Claim” in Aesthetics and Ethics” by Sofia Miguens: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4917

“Logic and Voice: Stanley Cavell and Analytic Philosophy” by Espen Hammer: https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4918

JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!

Notions of Existence in Frege

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Volume 9.8 of The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (JHAP) has now been published online, with full open-access:

https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/view/448

It features an article by Dolf Rami, entitled, “Notions of Existence in Frege.” Here is the abstract:

In this paper, I aim to present the main components of my non-standard interpretation of Frege’s views on existence to the English-speaking public (Rami 2017a, 2018, 2019a,b). First, I will outline the standard interpretation and show how to a great but not full extent the standard interpretation can be justified on the basis of Frege’s writings. Second, I show that the main error of the standard interpretation consists in the assimilation of the contents of the ordinary language expressions “exist” (“existiert”) and “there is” (“es gibt”) according to Frege. Third, I evaluate possible sources for this unfounded assimilation. After that, I outline my alternative interpretation that distinguishes in opposition to other non-standard interpretations between a substantive and a deflationary part of Frege’s complete conception of existence in analogy to Frege’s analysis of truth and negation. Fifthly, I justify my interpretation by the reconstruction of a so far overlooked master argument of Frege against the above-mentioned assimilation. In the last section, I introduce and discuss four objections against my interpretation that came to my attention.

JHAP is a free, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. It is available at https://jhaponline.org/. Submissions welcome!